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King II articulated in an open manner, issues of disclosure, transparency, comparator
ren1lmeration packages and a robust approach to the paYment of con1pensation in relation to
poorly performing directors. While directors owe fiduciary duties to the company
(shareholders present and future), by paying themselves huge packages, they do no longer act
in the best interests of the con1pany because awarding themselves exorbitant packages may
frustrate their duty to maximise shareholder value. The solution is that their interests be linked
to those of shareholders by requiring that their pay be linked to their performance. With the
advent of corporate governance reforms, other stakeholder interests have to be taken
cognisance of by directors in corporate decision Inaking. As such, a huge gap between the
salaries of rank and file employees and those of executive directors is seen as a conscious
move to ignore the interests of legitimate stakeholders when there is no compelling reason to
do so. To try and align the interest of shareholders and directors, it is felt that more emphasis
has to be placed on actively engaging shareholders and employees in the determination of
executive remuneration.
It is subn1itted that pay that is not linked to performance is a breach of fiduciary duties, in
particular, duty to avoid conflict of interest. However, our common law and Companies Act
61 of 1973 fail imn1ensely to address concerns relating to excessive remuneration pay. In
particular, the business judgment nl1e precludes minority shareholders taking action on the
basis of wrongs committed against the company by virtue of pay not being linked to
performance. Neither has the introduction of corporate governance reforms impacted heavily
on setting executive remuneration. They have not proved effective in curbing fat cat pay. It is
acknowledged that these reforms have ~rought about a profound impact on attitudes in the
corporate environment. However, numerous deficiencies, particularly in the context of South
Africa can be identified.
This thesis serves as a means of establishing whether fron1 a legal perspective, following
recent reforms, the negative impact of exorbitant remuneration pay is of such a serious nature
as to warrant more stringent regulation in one form or the other. South Africa should consider
revan1ping and tightening current legislation, which as submitted is lacking in a number of
respects. As a strategy to eradicate exorbitant pay, it is submitted that directors fiduciary
duties have to be revised and legislated in order to successfully establish directors'
III
wrongdoing. It is felt that legislative enactment may be made stronger by the fact that it may
have stronger and sharper teeth and hence able to reach where self-regulated codes are weak.
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1.0 Formulation of the Problem
This thesis investigates the law relating to the supervIsIon and regulation of directors
compensation in public companies in the light of King II report on corporate governance.
In a company setting, it is undoubtedly clear that executive directors play a pivotal role.
With the advent of recent corporate governance refonns, more emphasis is being placed on
the separation of ownership and control. Directors are held accountable to shareholders and
are given unfettered powers to run the con1pany in their discretion. 1 Shareholders nominate
theIn into these positions with the hope that they will run the business in a Inanner that will
maximize the value of the cOlnpany's equity. They not only have to protect Ininority
shareholders interests but also to take into account the interests of all other stakeholders.
A company is not bound to pay its directors, unless the Articles of Association authorises it
or unless melnbers in a general meeting have approved the remuneration.2 Depending on
the nature and tenns of the agreement reached between the company and the directors, the
services they afford the con1pany n1ay be rewarded. 3 Invariably in all cOlnpanies, executive
pay is detennined by the board of directors and or remuneration conlmittees. The upshot is
that the board of directors responsible for setting executive remuneration is often accused
of awarding packages that seem to be over the 'odds'. As a result, it is felt that they act in a
self-serving Inanner while ignoring the interests of the shareholders (generating maximum
shareholder retun1) and the con1pany as a whole. For as long as these executives pursue
IT Mongalo 'Corporate Governance reforms and directors remuneration, a critical comparative analysis:
Part J ' (Unpublished article), 2
2 Cilliers & Belnade Corporate Law 3rd ed, 138
3 Du Plessis Maaskappyregtelike Grondslae van die Regsposisie van Direkteure en Besturende Direkteure
1992 SA Merc LJ 243
1
their own agenda rather than seek to improve the profitability of the company, they are
seen to be imposing agency costs on investors.
4
As early as 1990, public controversy over top managers' pay packages started receiving
considerable attention in the media - The press released nUlnerous articles highlighting the
exorbitant remuneration packages that executive directors receive.
5
There has been a
widespread public outcry in South Africa and in other jurisdictions internationally about
what are perceived as excessive increases in remuneration of senior managers and
directors, particularly at a time of econolnic downturn, poor COlnpany results and centrally
agreed wage restraint for other ordinary norn1al workers. 6 South African executives have
also not had to pay for the misfortunes of the companies they run. Due to this, much debate
has arisen over whether such corporate 'fat cats' pay should be curtailed. The problem is
exacerbated by managers who are seen as performing badly and ultimately lose their jobs,
but leave with excessive' golden handshakes' while the company would in fact, be paying
for poor performance.7
Ordinarily, the interests of shareholders, on one hand, are to own a COlnpany that is directed
by executives who are dedicated to maximizing shareholder return on the investments they
made when they invested in the company. On the other hand, the directors' have an interest
4 BR Cheffins Company Law theory structure and operation (1997), 653
5 Some of the better-known public companies that recently awarded excessive pay are: South Africa's
Profurn's Gavin Walker, for instance, walked off with a R5-million golden handshake while the company
was left in ruins. Didata executives still eamed $3.7-million (R37-million) in 2001 despite a loss of 451.2-
million for the year. Shares were trading above R60 at the beginning of that period but were below RIO a year
later. They have not recovered ('Cutting off the fat' Sunday Business Report 7 July 2002. Eskom executive
directors recently (March 2003) pocketed perfoffilance bonuses worth a total of R6.56 million for the past
year amid a report that the electricity utility lost RI29 million last year as a result of a bungled foreign
exchange transaction. It further proposes to increase tariffs that are over inflation to try and fund its R50
billion capital expenditure over a period of 5 years. (MercUJ)i BusinessReport 12 March 2003). Equally
discrediting was the investor's reproach of the Nedcor's board for self-enriching themselves through a share
incentive scheme which rewarded a number of directors for the performance of extemal companies in which
Nedcor had invested. UK te1econununications giant Vodafone paid its chief executive, Christopher Gent, a
£1.5-million bonus even though the company's share price had plunged.
6 'Major controversy breaks out over top pay' www.eirofound.ie
7 Coleman Andrew, the fonner chief executive officer of SAA resigned from his position and he received a
handsome $28, 8 million golden handshake on departure available at Lynda Loxton 'Looking through the
smoke and minors of SAA 's financial results' Business Report, Tuesday 25 September 2001,
http://www.businessreport.co.za
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of getting the maximunl reward for the successful running of the company. These interests
often conflict because they do not have the same interests and incentives as shareholders,
and they engage in a self-serving matmer at the expense of shareholders.8 As Mongalo
indicates, the prevailing thesis is that executives act in their own interest rather than
endeavour to maxilnise shareholder value. 9
Agency costs imposed by directors can be addressed at different levels. Pursuant to the
principles developed by our courts, in the discharge of their obligations, directors are
expected to exercise their fiduciary duties. lO Directors owe duties to act in a company's
best interest, to avoid any conflict of interest between the company's interests and pursuing
their own interests, and have to accowlt for any personal profits accumulated while
carrying on the company's business. Il Our conlmon law recognizes that directors owe their
duty to the cOlnpany (shareholders, present and future). By paying themselves huge
packages, they do no longer act in the best interests of the company because taking huge
packages Inay frustrate their duty to maxilnise shareholder value. Fiduciary duties are
regulated at common law (particularly in case law). With exception of a very few conllnon
law and statutory rules limiting Inanagelnent powers, directors possess imlnense and ahnost
unlilnited powers in running their cOlnpanies. I2 The ordinary common law remedies
provided in our law are deficient and fail ilnmensely in adequately solving these problems.
Neither does the Companies Act 61 of 1973 deal with these issues sufficiently. It appears
that existing mechanisms in our law are lacking in a number of respects. They do not have
a shrinking effect on excessive executive remuneration packages that are without proper
justification - They do not seem to cUliail exorbitant remuneration packages being awarded
to executive directors. Thus, the solution is that their interests be linked to those of
8 H Stock' Warren Buffet takes $60000 pay cut' 20 March 2003, 5
9 T Mongalo 'Shareholder Activism in the UK highlights the failure ofremuneration cOl11.mittees: lessons for
South A.Fica' (Unpublished article), 2
:~ RC Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 2nd ed (1997), 152
BR Cheffins (note 4 above), 653
12 T Mongalo 'The emergence ofcorporate governance as a fundamental research topic in South Africa J
(2003) SALJ 173, 180. In tenns of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, various limitations discussed in
subsequent chapters are imposed which preclude arrangements being made by directors and the company for
payment of excessive amounts for their services. Certain forms of remuneration are prohibited unless the
shareholders consent has been engaged or sought. Under the common law, minority shareholders can utilize
Section 266 to obtain relief in circumstances where those running the company have ananged to pay
themselves exorbitant salaries.
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shareholders by requiring their pay to be linked to their perfonnance. One Inay further
argue that in today's corporate envirolunent, other stakeholder interests need to be taken
into account by directors in corporate decision-lnaking. As such, a huge gap between the
salaries of rank and file employees and those of the executive directors would be seen as a
conscious nl0ve to ignore the interests of legitimate stakeholders when there is no
compelling reason to do so. The issue therefore, for concern fronl a legal perspective is
whether the negative ilnpact of such excessive rewards is of such a serious nature as to
warrant regulation in one fonn or the other.
For these reasons and many others, efforts have to be made in some quarters to try and
limit such arrangements by ilnposing strict regulations and the law. Even with the
introduction of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002),
hereinafter referred to as King II, the issue of executive pay is still very problelnatic. In as
much as it is acknowledged that the Code of Good Corporate Practices addresses to a large
extent, disclosure, transparency, comparator renluneration and robust approach to the
paylnent of conlpensation in relation to poorly performing directors, it is still deficient and
needs to be fortified. South Africa may then look to other developed countries to try and
resolve and curtail excessive remuneration, which Inay be succeeding in this regard.
This thesis is intended as a contribution to the development of renluneration supervision
and regulation in a global context. Unlike other countries in the region, South Africa may
be on the brink of becoming a strong industrial nation, provided the govell1ffient succeeds
in gaining control over the economic difficulties. The country has rich human and mineral
resources, which need to be managed efficiently. To generate and n1axin1ize increased
shareholder return and to maintain and motivate its workforce, cOlnpanies must adopt good
corporate practices and effectively deal with the disparity between pay at the top (executive
director's) and pay at the bottonl (employees), and must endeavour to strike a correlation
between director's pay and performance. It is notewolihy that not much has been written on
South African corporate governance with regard to directors' renluneration, but King II's
introduction has probably had just as profound an effect on attitudes as any new rules and
regulations. However, it has to be developed and restluctured fUliher to try and address the
4
problems relating to excessive pay to tTIake it harder for bad bosses to walk away with
undeserved nlillions.
B Outline of the discussion
The discussion is divided into six chapters each dealing with a specific topic relating to
regulating directors retTIuneration. Each Chapter conlmences with a thorough discussion of
South African law, followed by a discussion of what happens in other jurisdictions like
Britain, United States of America and Germany. As far as possible, the points investigated
in these systenls are discussed in the same order to facilitate the comparison.
The following topics within the field of corporate remuneration committees' supervision
and regulation are dealt with:
1. Principles and problems underlying executive remuneration
2. The position of the common law and the Companies Act 61 of 1973 on
executive renluneration
3. Developments that led to corporate govetnance reform
4. RecomtTIendations in corporate governance reform in South Africa and the
United Kingdonl
5. A critical analysis of the recommendations
6. Effectiveness of recommendations in the South African context
7. Conclusions/recommendations
5
1.0 THE PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS UNDERLYING EXECUTIVE
REMUNERATION
The public company arena is not free of error and certain criticisms related to perceived
excesses would be expected where a company's perfonnance in respect of earnings,
sustainability of share price, revenue, and its market share would not warrant substantial
pay increases of the executive team. 13 There can be no objection to good pay for good
perfonnance, but the justification for generous pay schemes is not always apparent,
particularly where profits are falling or staff is being made redundant. 14 The compensation
of executives has caused heated debate and commentators have been very critical of the
large increases in compensation received by directors of public companies, and of the
methods adopted in setting pay and other cOlnponents of compensation. lS A number of
problelns are leveled against executive relnuneration. Not only is it regarded as spiraling
out of control, but there are other discrepancies that raise concern that are associated with
it. Shareholders and the labour workforce have been concen1ed with two main particular
aspects over executive pay packages. These are firstly, it is not linked to perfonnance in
any way, and secondly, there is a disparity between pay at the top and pay at the bottOln.
These two concerns triggered the institution of corporate goven1ance reforms in this area of
executive remuneration.
1.1.1 THE POOR CORRELATION BETWEEN PAY AND PERFORMANCE
At a time when companies are keen to promote pay schen1es on performance, too often the
links between directors' pay and perfolmance are viewed as non-existent. 16 The argument
that is posed is that if executive pay is not linked to performance, executive directors will
relax and not place much effort in generating increased shareholder return, as they know
that they will get paid anyway. Even if the share price, revenue profits and turnover,
13 L Johnson 'How much is too much? Or not enough?' (2001) Australian Financial Review 16,20
14 C Hurst 'Special report: Executive pay' 30 August 2001 The Guardian
15 R Tricker Corporate Governance (2000) 704 For instance, a huge number of newspaper articles on
exorbitant executive pay awards and their criticisms are leveled almost on a weekly basis.
16 L Jolmson 'Companies should justify directors' remuneration packages' (2001) Australian Financial
review 16, 21
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increase or decrease, they will not be affected in any way. The issue raised is that executive
directors are contributing very little in terms of adding value to company share prices. For
those who are failing to perform, at expected levels, executive relTIuneration can be utilized
as a way of enhancing perfonnance. Article 2.5.1 of the Code of Best Practices discourages
unifoffil remuneration packages. Executive directors have a tendency of awarding
thelnselves huge relnuneration packages because they always feel they are getting a tiny
fraction of what the companies make in profits. 17 This is why they act in a self-serving
lnamler to benefit themselves rather than endeavor to lnaxinlize shareholder retunl.
Cheffins 18 indicates that if top executives receive substantial rewards when company
position is iInproving and meaningful penalties when performance is poor, then they should
logically strive towards doing what is best for shareholders as a priority. Often, "executive
directors are handsomely rewarded when the share price goes up, but hardly suffer any fall
in such rewards should the equity value decline.,,19 The Labour research service recently
undertook an investigation into what directors are being paid in South Africa. It also looked
into the continued failure of companies to disclose directors' salaries. 20
Profuffi's Gavin Walker received a R5 million golden parachute while the company he
headed was left in ruins. 21 As recent as March 2003, Eskom executive directors recently
(March 2003) pocketed perfoffilance bonuses worth a total of R6.56 million for the last
year (2002). This included a massive R4.5 nlillion for the financial director, and R2 lnillion
for its chief executive officer. Over and above the R4.5 Inillion perfonnance bonus for the
finance director, he also got an aIIDual salary ofR821, 000 and an additional allowance of
R344, 000, a 36.2% increase on his salary for 200l.This reward was made amid a report
that the electricity utility lost· Rl29 nlillion last year as a result of a bungled foreign
h . 22 O· dexc ange transactIon. ne Just won el'S whether sound corporate governance principles
:: T Mongalo 'COlporate law and Corporate governance' 1sI ed (2003), 220
BR Cheffins (note 4 above), 654
19 T Mongalo (note 17 above), 220
20 'Why still secrecy around directors' salaries' (2002) Vol 26 (2), 42 the lack of transparency around
directors' fees was derived from a survey of 80 companies. Executive directors' earnings are up by 23% from
2000 from an average of RI 511 323 for 2000 to an average of RI 859 626 for 2001. This is almost three
times the rate of inflation, and three times higher than the increase of low paid workers.
2! A Shevel 'Cutting away the fat' www.sunda.Y.t!D1es.co.za/articles
22 . -----.----..---
K Phaslwe 'Eskom awards high powered bonuses' 12 March 2003 Business Report
h.!!R://www.businessreport.co.za
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were observed in this foreign exchange deal. A R4 million perfolmance bonus for the
financial director appears hardly justifiable while millions were lost.
In the UK, the average pay and pension package of executive managers in UK's 100 largest
firms rose to £1.73 million last year at a time when the stock nlarket had crashed by a
quarter. 23 Vodafone also awarded £1.5 million to its chief executive officer when the share
price continued to decline?4 The National Association of Pensions Fund has urged its
melnbers to protest against relnuneration practices at Barclays, Reuters, Shell and
Schroders. 25 In Reuters, the association was puzzled as to why top management had eanled
bonuses worth £2.2 Inillion in a year when the share price had fallen by more than two-
thirds. 26 The SaIne goes for BP's chief executive who collected £4.9 million in annual
rewards and pension contributions in 2002.27 The share price moves and dividend paynlents
have fallen by nearly a quarter in the past three years. 28 In Germany, fOlmer directors of
Mannesmaml, a telecoms company that was taken over by British Vodafone in 2000, are
being sued over executive payouts of €128 Inillion at the time of the deal. The directors
however deny any form of wrongdoing. 29
One foreign COlnpany that seeks to try and align pay and performance based on the
cOlnpany's profitability or market value is American Express. Its chief executive Ken
Chenault received $20,9million in 2002, a 25 per cent decline from 2001, as the company's
shares fell 1 percent.30 For us to try and align the interests of the company shareholders, on
the one hand, and those of the executive directors, on the other, a correlation between
23 K Griffith 'UK bosses earn more but return less' 21 May 2003 Business Report
http://www.businessreport.co.za
24 A Shevel (note 18 above). Other equally discrediting rewards include Didata, which awarded its executives
£3.7 million (R37 million) in 2001 financial year despite a loss of 451.7 million for that period. Shares were






29 'The fat cats are still grabbing all the cream. ' 27 April 2003 Business report,
http://www.businessreport.co.za
30 Stock H 'Warren Buffet takes $60 000 pay cut' http://www.businessreport.co.za 20lh March 2003
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executive pay and performance Inust be struck.3l Companies have to strive towards
avoiding paying for failure. The Greenbury con11nittee in the United Kingdom was formed
in order to cure these ills on director's remuneration. In South Africa, para 2.5 of the Code
of Corporate Practices and Conduct, Appendix V and Section 1 of the King II considers
issues relating to executive pay.
Although the following pay components are still to be discussed in detail hereunder, they
do not seem to be aligned in any way to performance. For one, share options, give
executive directors the right to hold on to shares when the company is successful, and they
do not feel the pinch when companies perfolID badly. They exercise the option when the
share price has risen over the strike price in the market. If the share price drops below the
strike price, the executive will not exercise the option and is in no worse off position.32
Share options are not aligned at all to perfornlance in that they allow directors to benefit
when the company is successful but do not get to penalize them when things are going
badly. As Cheffins indicates, they operate in a sense as a one-way bet.33 This poses a
probleln because in essence, if the company performance is below expected levels,
shareholders incur genuine losses. The basic characteristics of share options are provided
for in the Greenbury report on executive pay.34 A severance package is another component
of renluneration package that poses problems. It would seem that conlpanies, which grant
exorbitant golden handshakes, are actually paying for poor performance or reward for
failure. This is so because in Inost instances, they are paid handsomely on their departure
while the share price would have plunged. Section 1, Chapter IV, Para 13 of King II
addresses this issue. It provides that full disclosure of severance pay has to be made to
avoid abuse of the process. Greenbuly Report makes mention of this concern in para 1.7
and 7.2 of its report. Conlpanies with strict policies that link perfonnance to pay packages
seeln to be the solution to justifying hefty conlpensations. However, in as Inuch as we
31 In a recent survey held by the Incomes Data Services in 1999, it was noted that executive pay in the UK
rose on average 17.6 per cent in 1998 and that there was really no correlation between remuneration and
company performance.
32 BR Cheffins (note 4 above), 657
33 Ibid.
34 Para 6.24 and 6.25
9
aspIre for good govenlance, a number of problelTIs associated with this concern can
ensue. 35
1.1.2 THERE IS A DISPARITY BETWEEN PAY AT THE TOP, AND PAY AT THE
BOTTOM
Another concern is that there is an unjustifiable rift between what a chief executive officer
gets and what ordinary workers get. The concern is that executive pay increases way above
the inflation rate while the workforce rises in with or even below the inflation rate. 36 Most
recently (August 2003), the South African Reserve Bank governor, Tito Mboweni, who
accepted a 12 per cent pay rise in 2002, received a fUliher 9 percent hike on his salary
package for the year to March 2004, which is more than double the inflation target set for
the year. 37 While the level of executive pay is an internationally elTIotive issue, the
problem in South Africa is that it has becoITIe politicized. Congress of South African Trade
Unions (Cosatu) and related interested parties allege that the gap between executive
remuneration packages and those of rank and file elTIployees is reflective of the apartheid
wage gap and has to be resolved. 38 Cosatu and other concerned unions' are of the opinion
that this disparity can ilTIpact negatively on the performance and productivity of employees
at lower levels. As Mongal039 points out, it can lead to labor unrests, as information on
executive remuneration will be utilized by trade unions to try and justify clailTIs for
increased wage packages for ordinary workers. The Hampel COlTImittee at para 4.2 and the
35 These will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4. It is arguable that once director's pay fluctuates
constantly, as a result of trying to link perfo1111ance and pay, directors may probably leave for more stable
surroundings, and as a result, the company will lose the skill and expertise that the director possessed. In
addition, the market price may be influenced by other external factors that may lead to humongous market
crash (E.g. the US September 11 th 2001) episodes. We saw the dollar and other cUlTencies plummet low but
this in no way was related to the performance of individual directors within their companies. 'Are top
managers worth it? viewpoint' www.guardian.co.uk/viewpoint
36 BR Cheffins (note 4 above), 657-658
37 M Le Roux 'Mboweni's wage target is higher than SA's' Business Report 21 August 2003, 1. The governor
is being criticized for accepting such a huge package as he has been urging employers to keep the inflation
target in mind when making salary determinations. The Central Bank has set inflation targets at between 3
percent and 6 percent for the year. The bank's justification is that the remuneration committee in deciding pay
packages does take cognizance of the inflation target but has to consider other factors as well. The Federation
of Unions of South Africa accuse the governor of applying double standards and of being a hypocrite as he
recently criticized labour unions of fuelling inflation by excessive wage demands.
~; Mnyanda 'Companies dismiss call to disclose executive pay' Business Day, 2 April 1996,10
T Mongalo (note 15 above), 222
10
JSE Listing Requirements (Schedule 22) note that this is an area of concern that may lead
to resentnlent and it notes that those who make decisions must be 'sensitive to the wider
scene, including pay and elnployment conditions elsewhere in the group, especially when
determining annual salary increases.'
Cosatu aims to gain support to try and alleviate and reduce the wage gap as promoted by
the Employment and Equity Act of 1998.40 This Act upholds and endorses the
constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true delnocracy; eliminates unfair
discrimination in employnlent; ensures the implelnentation of equity to redress the effects
of discrimination; requires the workforce to be broadly representative of the South African
population; and it also prolnotes econolnic development and efficiency in the workforce.
Presently, in South Africa, the wage ratio is at 50:1 and 100:1.41 Cosatu calls for a
reduction of this gap to 8:1.42 It Inakes reliance on other jurisdictions like New Zealand and
Switzerland, where the gap has been tremendously reduced. 43 It is felt that there is a need
to nanow down the wage gap within companies as a step towards moral and social
responsibilities, which are intenlal concerns to a company's success. This is not just a
problem in South Africa only; in the United Kingdonl, the pay differential between
directors and their elnployees grew by nl0re than 50 per cent between 1994 and 2001.44 In
America, the average chief executive officer of a medium sized corporation earns 531
tilnes as much in pay, bonuses and stock options as the average factory worker. 45
The Hmnpel Committee also acknowledged that disclosure of spiraling managerial
compensation can impact on the workforce and the morale of the employees can be
affected trenlendously. 46 However, it should be noted that cOlnpanies will not ordinmily
risk losing directors who are skilled by reducing their cOlnpensation packages over low
ranking elnployees who emn far less. It would seem that the rates at which executive
40 M Renderson 'SA executives are not suchfat cats' Cape Argus 18 September 2002
41 Ibid
42 The government's target, on the other hand is a ratio of 12: 1
43 ( Note 40 above)
44 A Shevel (note 21 above)
45 A Kakabadse 'Corporate governance in South Africa: Evaluation of the King II Report (Draft)' (2002)
Journal ofchange Management, 314
46
Para 4.2 Rampel Report
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directors and ordinary employees are paid at largely depend on the industry and situation of
each company. In as much as King II advocates that salaries should be paid in accordance
with qualifications and with the value executives add, it is sublnitted that other stringent
measures should be adopted to try and curtail excessive rewards. 47 Bonuses, on the other
hand, should also be realistic and in line with perfonnance. The issue that relnains is to
detennine how best these can be resolved.
In today's corporate environn1ent, other stakeholder interests need to be taken into account
by directors in corporate decision-n1aking. As such, a huge gap between the salaries of rank
and file elnployees and those of the executive directors is seen as a conscious n10ve to
ignore the interests of legitilnate stakeholders when there is no compelling reason to do so.
1.2 THE NATURE OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
Remuneration packages for top managetnent are largely based on extemallnarket related
salary surveys and packages within comparable cOlnpanies.48This not only applies to the
level of pay of executive directors, but it also applies to the nature of the components of
ren1uneration and the proportionate demarcation between basic pay and perfonnance
related incentives.49 It is worth noting that the fact that a person is appointed as a director
does not ipso facto entitle him to claim relnuneration. 50 However, if provision for
ren1uneration is made in the articles, such provision affords sufficient authority to apply
funds of the company as relnuneration on the basis set out in the articles. If the articles do
not provide for it, the con1pany may still pay remuneration in tenns of a contract entered
into between the director and the company. As King II advices, in reviewing individual
elelnents of executive directors' packages, the ren1uneration cOlnn1ittees have to take
advice fron1 independent consultants as well. 51
47 King Il, para 2.4.2
48 T Wixley , G Everingham ' Corporate Governance' 1st ed (2002), 56
49 Ibid
50 Cilliers & Benade COl1JOrate Law 3rd ed (2000), 138
51 Ibid, 59; King Il par 2.7.8
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1.3 AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE EXECUTIVE PAY
Ordinarily, under South African con1pany laws, the company In a general n1eeting
detennines the remuneration of the directors. 52 The Aliicles of association empowers the
board of directors to appoint individuals to executive positions and then set their pay. 53 In
other words, it is the board of directors, which, according to traditional corporate
governance, sets executive relnuneration packages. Micles 61 and 62 of Table A and B
restates this position as follows
'the directors may froln tilne to tilne appoint one or more of their body to the office of
managing director or manager for such tenn and at such relnuneration (whether by way of
salary or commission or participation in profits or partly in one way and partly in another)
as they lnay think fit and n1ay revoke such appointment'.
In the case of Brown v Nanco (Pty) Ltd,54 some shareholders made an application under
section 266(3) of the Companies Act55 for the appointlnent of a provisional curator ad
litem to investigate a claim which the respondent company was alleged to have against four
of its directors. The dispute arose between the shareholders and the directors with regard to
whether the directors were entitled to any remuneration over and above that which the
company in a general meeting had authorized. Article 66 of the company's Articles n1ade
provision for the detennination of the director's relTIuneration by the COlTIpany in a general
lneeting frOln tilne to time. Pursuant to this Article 66, the company had set the
relnuneration of the directors in certain amounts. In addition, the directors of the company
had authorized the payment to four of them of certain further additional amounts, which
were tenned as 'n1anagelnent commissions'. FUlihelIDore, Aliicle 87 of the COlTIpany's
article provided that 'a director lnay hold any other office or position of profit in the
COlnpany, other than that of auditor, in cOlmection with his directorship, and may be
appointed thereto upon such telms as to ren1uneration, tenure of office and otherwise as
52 Table A and B (articles 54 and 55)
53 T Mongalo (note 17 above), 213
54 1976 (3) SA 832 (W)
55 Companies Act No 61 of 1973
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may be arranged by the directors, subject to the tenus of any agreement entered into in any
paliicular case. '
The issue raised required an interpretation of the meaning and effect of Article 87, which
remained the only clause under which a justification of these payments could be nlade.
Elliot J was of the view that there was a prilua facie cause of action for the recovery of the
manageluent comluission paid to the directors. The court upheld these additional paynlents,
on the basis that the directors performed such burdensonle duties that it was considered that
the remuneration fixed by the company in general meeting was not adequate, and were as
such, entitled to receive extra remuneration, which amount would be fixed in line with the
profits generated by the company.
From the above case, it can be appreciated that there is a distinction between Inanagement
reluuneration and director's fees. The latter comprises of fees that are paid to directors on
attending lueetings and carrying out other related duties. The former, which forms the core
of this thesis, refers to what executive directors receive for carrying out managerial
activities on behalf of a conlpany. Often, top executive directors of public companies do
not bother to claim and receive their directors' fees, which tend to be negligible when
compared with their own pay packages.56 Over and above the retainer that they are entitled
to, they also receive other fringe benefits that ordinarily can be found in executive
reluuneration packages. 57 The components of these pay packages will be discussed
hereunder.
56 "SA companies disclose remuneration of non executive directors' The Boardroom, April 1998. This article
reports that PE Corporate Services carried out a survey of 212 companies at the end of 1997, which reveals
that non-executive directors earn a retainer or fee calculated on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. Their
responsibilities comprise of the following: attending board meetings; attending other committee meetings;
special projects or consultancy work; and other activities such as assisting with the budget reviews and
str'ategic planning. The average daily fees paid to non-executive directors are R 3850 for board meetings;
R2990 for committee meetings; R2390 for special projects and other activities. The average number of days
spent by non-executive directors almually on each activity is 6,4 days attending board meetings; 5,9 days
attending committee meetings; 18,9 days on special projects and consultancy work; and 25,5 days on other
activities. Thus, the average annual retainer earned by a non-executive is about R147 779.
57 They are entitled to other benefits like lavish office acconul1odation, car allowances, housing subsidies,
accident and life insurance, car and travel expenses, holiday acconunodation, club subscriptions, rental and
lease payments etc. A non executive director will get RI, 2million on average per month
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1.4 COMPONENTS OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in clause 2.5, Appendix V of King 2 Repoli
and para 6.14 of the Greenbury Report provides an overview and guidelines of the
composition of an executive package. The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct in
clause 2.5.4 provides that 'cOlnpanies should provide full disclosure of director
remuneration on an individual basis giving details of eanlings, share options and all other
benefits'. These comprise of the following
1.4.1 BASIC SALARY
Salaries are determined on a periodic basis. They do not change according to company
perfonnance; as such, it does not really matter whether the share price plummets or goes
up. Even though it does not fluctuate with performance, it Inay be reviewed from time to
tiIne when an assessment of all employees of the company is undeIiaken. 58 It is set with
reference to external market data, relating to sinlilar companies based in the area and
internationally, which are cOInparable in tenllS of size, Inarket sector, business cOInplexity
and inteInational scope. 59 Individual perfonnance and any increased responsibilities Inay
also be taken into consideration. 6o In South Africa, basic salary usually consists of over half
of an executive director's remuneration package. Even though SOlne components of
renluneration fluctuate in accordance with the performance of the company, basic salary is
a guaranteed item of the reInuneration package and does not usually oscillate. Recent
corporate refOlms move towards performance related conlponents of renluneration such as
annual bonus scheInes and long term incentive schemes which may impact heavily on
increased basic salaries, which as King II states in para 2.5.5 of the Code, that
'perfonnance related elements of remuneration should constitute a substantial portion of
58 Para 3.4 of King II Appendix V moves for dates for review of such basic salaries to be an appropriate time
for evaluating the performance of individual directors, on which dates, salaries may also be adjusted.
59 Extract from Anglo American plc's 2001 Ammal Report (remuneration report).
60 Ibid
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the total remuneration package of executives In order to align their interests with the
shareowners' .
1.4.2 BONUS SCHEME
This component may be structured in a variety of ways. The most common form being a
short-term incentive scheme alulual bonus plan. In various cOlnpanies, executive directors
maybe eligible to participate in an mmual bonus plan, which is typically based on the
achievelnent of short-term perfonnance targets, which are relevant to individual executive
directors. 61 In South Africa, some cOlnpanies try to make it a guaranteed item in the
remuneration package of a director and yet ordinarily, it is only to be granted to executive
directors upon targets being Inet. The fundamental basis of having conlponents of executive
pay linked to corporate performance is to give managelnent an incentive to run the
company in a way that enhances shareholder return and also improves corporate
perfonnance. 62 The 2001 annual reports of Joluulic Communications (Jolmcom) and South
African Breweries (SABMiller), reflect that Paul Jenkins earned total emolunlents of R3, 2
million, of which R1, 8million was a bonus; Irene Chmllley received R4 million, of which
R2, 8 million was a bonus; Paul Edwards received R11nlillion, of which R8 million was a
bonus; and Jacob Modise earned R3, 4million, of which R2 million was a bonus. Chanlley
and Edwards have both since resigned. 63 In a typically large company, executive directors
can receIve between 15 to 20 percent of bonus as calculated on the remuneration
packages. 64
1.4.3 LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN (LTIP)
This form of incentive is set over a long period of time. Should the company reach its
targets within $uch a period, directors would then be entitled to such paylnents. It differs
61 T Wixley, G Everingham (note 48 above), 59
62 1T Monga 0 (note 17 above), 216
63 'S d T' d' , 13 th S bun ay Imes e Itors note eptem er 2002 Sunday Times
64 B Cheffins, R Thomas 'Should shareholders have a greater say over executive pay?: Learning from the US
experience' (2001) Journal ofC01porate law studies 277, 278. See also 'Executives must perform for cash',
SA Sunday Times, 10 September 2000, ww"Yv.suntimes.co.za In all the instances cited above the bonus
component of the executive remunerati~'~ad~up wel~;~r 50 per cent of the entire remu~eration packages
of these executives. One may then conclude that these are exceptions from the general practice.
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from short-term annual bonuses in that it is awarded after several years rather than on an
annual basis.65 A director can then either receive this benefit in the form of money or
shares. Mongalo indicates that it operates in such a way that once the plan is set up, a
number of years will go by and a detennination is Inade whether the company has managed
to exceed its performance targets. 66 These are not COlnlnon in South Africa. Nedcor, a
group of South African banks, recently fonnulated an LTIP structure, in which it was to
reward a number of its directors for the perfonllance of external cOlnpanies in which it had
invested. 67 The effect of the scheme was that the participants would lose nothing if the
value of investments declined, yet gain much nl0re if it increased. 68 The incentive was not
at all linked to the performance of each director in his or her own respective companies.
This proposal aroused media and investor protests; the chairman sought to justify the
scheme but was forced to withdraw it. Anglo Alnerican plc awarded its first LTIP in 2001
at an annual value of 120 per cent of basic salary for the chief executive and one times
basic salary for the other Inain board executive directors. 69 In order to align the interests of
shareholders and executive directors, the company assisted the directors to build up a
shareholding in the company through this arrangement. Its annual report indicates that
within five years, the executive directors will be expected to acquire a holding of shares
with a value of one and a half times base salary, in the case of the chief executive, and one
times base salary in the case of other executive directors. 70
In the UK, companies must generally seek shareholder approval before introducing a new
long-term incentive scheme. 71 As these schemes serve to align the interests of shareholders
and executives, this approval is usually given, even when the potential rewards are
significant. In addition, shareholders have the oppoliunity to give ongoing approval as,
under best practice guidelines, they can vote on remuneration reports at company annual
general meetings. However, these votes are only 'advisory' in nature, and as such, are
likely to have a linlited impact. Approval of director's renluneration reports for the
65 T Mongalo (note 15 above), 216
66 Ibid
67 A Kakabadse (Note 45 above), 306
68 T Mongalo (note 17 above), 216
69 Anglo American plc 2001 Alillual Report, as quoted by T Wixley, G Everingham, 59
70 Ibid
71 R Booker 'Getting a fair day's pay' 16 August 2002 The Guardian
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financial year in listed companies is governed by section 241A of the UK COlnpanies Act,
1985. In terms of this section, companies ought to give all their Inembers notice of
intention to pass an ordinary resolution at a meeting, prior to the meeting meant for
reviewal of financial annual accounts of the cOlllpany. Most recently, in May 2003,
GlaxoSnlithKline company shareholders declined to vote on the CEG's golden parachute
of 22 Inillion in the event of his dismissal, irrespective of underperformance. Fifty one per
cent of the members in attendance at the nleeting rejected the golden handshake.
72
Sinlilar
results reflecting shareholder activism can be seen in other Inultinational cOlnpanies - 23
per cent of the shareholders at Shell and 33 per cent of members at Bat'clay's plc rejected
salary packages.73 It is clear from these incidents that the shareholders are really tired of
top executives who are handsomely rewarded for non-perfolmance. There is really no
justification for such excessive payouts when equity share prices plumlnet.
1.4.4 SHARE OPTIONS
As earlier indicated, share options have always been criticized as benefits that are not
linked in any way to perfolmance. It is alleged that share options allow management to
benefit when a company is doing well but do not penalize such individuals when
performance is unsatisfactory.74 In this case, the company enters into an agreelnent with the
executive that the company will sell the shares held in the cOlnpany at a predetermined
price and the executive will sell or dispose these shares during or at a particular tinle in the
future. The advantage is that the price at which the executive director will buy will be the
agreed price arrived at the time they entered into the agreelnent with the COlupany. Thus,
there is a build-in incentive to exercise the share options granted when the company's share
price rises above the strike price or exercise price. Obviously, if the market price at the
time the option is exercised is higher than the conlpany's share price, the executive would
benefit since he will be buying the shares cheaply, without having had to Inake the capital
72 T Mongalo 'Lots of filthy lucre: Shareholder activism in the UK may be signifying the failure of




expenditure to buy the shares. Presumably, the directors will work harder so that the market
price will be much higher than the exercise (or agreed) price. If the n1arket value is higher,
they will exercise the option, and then sell the shares so bought at a profit. This is because
at the time the director exercises the option, the shares are bought at a discount, thus
generating a profit for the director.
Undoubtedly, the directors holding such options will not exercise the option by purchasing
shares at the tiIne the market value is less than the agreed (or exercise) price. The directors
will exercise the options when the company is perfonning well and logically, they will
refrain from selling their shares when the con1pany is perfolming poorly. As it is, there will
be a loss of profitable opportunity but the executive will be in no financially worse off
position.75 The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (King II), makes provision for
this fOIm of incentives in 2.5.6 and 2.5.7. King II recomlnends that disclosure of the option
price and the price of the shares at the time it is exercised should be made. Non-executive
directors are also entitled to the same benefits. 76 In South Africa, an executive officer will
receive about 10 per cent of his or her compensation in the fonn of share options.
1.4.5 PERKS/PERQUISITES
King I makes n1ention of the different types of benefits in kind, that executive directors
may be entitled to. Benefits in kind (or perks) include benefits such as a fully paid for
COInpany car, holiday hOIne, pension contributions, life assurance, health and disability
insurance, clothing allowances overseas holidays, lavish office accomn10dation, club
membership fees and Inany others.
75 Ibid
76 Para 2.5.6 of the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. The grant of share options to non-executive
directors is subject to shareholder approval at an AGM. This results in the dilution of their independence.
Greenbury Report at 6.24 and 6.25 summarize the characteristics of executive remuneration.
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1.4.6 SEVERANCE PACKAGES
Strictly speaking, these are not a component of ren1uneration package. An executive
director n1ay be fired, disInissed or resign fron1 his duties in terms of Aliicle 65(c) of Table
A before his term of service expires. Section 220 (1) (a) and (7) of the COInpanies Act
gives the company the powers to tenninate a n1anagerial service contract before the
expiration of a director's tenn of office expires. The section reads as follows
'a company may, notwithstanding anything in its meInorandum or articles or in any
agreeInent between it and any director, by resolution remove a director before the
expiration of his period of office'. It goes on to read that
'nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a person removed thereunder of
compensation or dalnages which Inay be payable to him in respect of the termination of his
appointment as director or of any appointment terminating with that of director or as
derogating from any power to reInove a director which may exist apart froln this section'
The director n1ay ultimately have to resign frOIn his position as an executive director.
Where an executive director has a five-year contract and is tem1inated after just two years,
it means it still had three years to run and the director Inay wish to sue the company. It
follows then that where a service contract is prematurely tem1inated, a director can in these
circumstances sue on the basis of breach of contract. Such cases do not usually end in
courts of law because con1panies are not keen to attend to lengthy court proceedings, which
Inay ultimately affect the financial position of the cOInpany as it brings disrepute to the
name and performance of the company. The general public and other cOInpanies n1ay
decline to invest in such a cOInpany on discovery that such a director was not performing
well.
The dalnages usually agreed on settlement are golden handshakes. Depending on the time
that was left at the time the contract was terminated, the dalnages involved in these golden
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parachutes can be excessive - The longer the term of the contract, the greater the damages
paylnent would be. 77 Many companies see such payouts as a better price to pay than to
endure image destruction that could be brought about by litigation. Therefore, executives
tend to have the upper hand when negotiating golden handshakes because they know that
conlpanies are not willing to face embarrassing litigation, which places theln before the
media. They are usually tenlled rewards for failure. 78 A typical example in South Africa is
the Coleman Andrews (former CEO of South African Airways) saga, who resigned fronl
his position 18 Inonths before the expiration of his four year service contract. 79 Besides the
large salary he earned he n1anaged to secure a golden handshake in the amount of
$28,8million (about R230 million) when he departed. Shareholders of GlaxoSmithKline,
Europe's largest dnlg maker, recently (May 2003) rejected proposals on executive pay of
some top nlanagers on the basis that salary and severance packages were not linked to share
performance. 8o They are urging the con1pany to change its chief executive's severance
plan, which would pay hinl up to $28 million if he were fired. The concern as voiced by
some investors is that 'Glaxo's scheme has significant rewards that are not tied to
outstanding performance'. 81 It is felt that this plan does not meet best practice standards
for UK corporate governance. The Greenbury cOlnn1ittee observed SOlne of these concerns
over severance packages and King II goes a step further and requires full disclosure of
severance packages, where, as it says' abuse can take place'. 82
It is acknowledged that it is in the company's best interests to Inake the above benefits
available to its employees and directors, and to attract and retain suitable talented staff. A
con1pany that does not offer the type of benefits as n1entioned above n1ay well find itself in
a weak bargaining position in attracting staff, especially skilled staff. McLe1U1an subInits
77 Greenbury Comn1ittee on the dynamics of severance packages in para 13, 7.3 and 7.8
78 The UK Department of Trade and Industry recently (May 2003) published proposals to try and curb
exorbitant pay packages termed 'Rewards for failure'. Sapa AP 'Unions hail UK paper on fat cat pay'
Business Report, Friday 6 June 2003: www.businessreport.co.za
79 L Loxton 'Looking tlu'ough the smoke and mirrors of SAA 's financial results' Business Report, Tuesday,
September 25,2001 http://www.businessreport.co.za
80 Note 72 above
81 Glaxo shares are said to be trading at about a third lower than in late 2000, when Jean-Pierre Gamier, the
chief executive, received £2.4 million in salary and bonus in 2002. The shares have fallen 17 per cent in the
past 12 months, compared with a 23 per cent decline in the benchmark FTSE 100 index.
82 Para 1.7 and 7.2. A SmerdonPractical Guide to Corporate Governance (1998),70-72
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that because these benefits are so well established, it would seem ulmecessary to make
provision for them in the Companies Act. 83 This is so because these are enjoyed by
employees in both private and public companies. Moreover, it would not be feasible to
attempt to prescribe what benefits should be lTIade available for any given enterprise.
Because of the nature and activities carried on by different companies, the extent to which
any benefits are provided must depend upon the needs of each individual company. A large
public company might offer a wide variety of benefits. 84
King II recommends that lengthy servIce contracts should be avoided and further
recomlTIends that all service contracts should not exceed a period of three years in duration
unless an extension is othelwise approved by shareholders and it is disclosed and n10tivated
with reasons. 85 It follows, then, that if such consent is sought and given, an executive
director can still be a beneficiary of a rolling contract, which constantly renews itself. 86
Following recent scandals at, mTIongst others, WOrldCOITI and Em"on in the United States of
An1erica, it should be observed that while corporate directors are still to carry out their
obligations owed to the company as a whole, cOlnpanies will not regain investor trust for as
long as chief executives con1pensation, including share options, rises while shares of their
con1panies fall in value. 87 High pay may undermine companies' morale and pay structures,
or create cOITIpetition for the top jobs so that succession politics instead of sound business
n1anagelTIent becon1es the priority.88 Of course the people driving a company's success
need to be appropriately rewarded for their achieveInents, but until companies have the
proper checks and balances at the heart of their lTIanageITIent, there is a danger that
shareholders - and Inillions of ordinary people who rely on such investments could see
lTIOney due to them diverted to unjustified schemes.89
83 J McLennan 'Misapplication ofcompany funds - a proposal for reform 1 (1993 ) SALJ, 654
84 Ibid .
85 Clause 2.5.9 of the Code of Corporate Practices
86
Greenbury Report para 7.4; Mongalo (note 15 above), 217
87 'Warren Buffet takes $60 000 pay cut' 20 March 2003, http://www.BusinessTimes.co.za
88 Hunt 'Executive pay' 30 August 2001 The Guardian
89 Ibid
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In the light of the discussion above, it is apparent that stringent corporate goven1ance
principles in South Africa have to be resorted to as a way of dealing with the problem of
executive remuneration. The question is whether our law and systen1s in place can assist us
in resolving and inhibiting excessive rellluneration packages.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COMMON LAW PERTINENT TO EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
2.0 COMPANY DIRECTORS
All cOlnpanies must necessarily act through individuals. The Companies Act provides that
every public company Inust have at least two directors, every private conlpany one.
90
The
aliicles usually regulate the number of directors and their appointnlent. 91 The company in a
general meeting usually elects thenl.92 Even though a classification of directors is not found
in statutes, a distinction is nlade between executive and non-executive directors in modern
cOlnpany structures.93 An executive director is a director who is involved in a day-to-day
management of the COlnpany and or is in full tinle salaried employnlent of the cOlnpany. A
non-executive director, on the other hand, is a director who is not involved in day-to-day
management and is not salaried elnployee of the COlnpany.
The impoliance of a non-executive director is illustrated by the fact that the status of the
non-executive director was comprehensively considered in recent reviews of corporate
govemance. 94 As a generallule, non-executive directors attend and vote at meetings of the
board, but do not work full time for the conlpany and have no service contract, whereas
90 Section 208(1); Table A art 53 and Table B art 54. Section 2 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 defines a
director as 'any person occupying the position of director or alternate director irrespective of the name by
which he may be designated.
91 HR Hahlo South African Company Law through the Cases: A Source Book 5th ed (1991),330
92 Table A arts 66-69; Table B art 67
93 The distinction between executive directors and non executive directors was discussed in Fisheries
Development COlporation ofSA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (W), wherein the court made a distinction
in respect of a director's duty of care and skill. Margo J confirmed that the extent of this duty depends to a
considerable extent on the nature of the company's business and on any particular obligations assumed by or
assigned to him. In that regard, the cOUli held, there is a difference between the full time or executive director,
who participates in the day to day management of the company's affairs or of a portion thereof, and the non
executive director who has not undertaken any special obligation. The latter would not be required to give
continuous attention to the affairs of his company. However, the non-executive director should not assume
that his duties would always be less onerous. Since the modern non executive director is likely to be
professionally qualified, or at least endowed with a particular expertise, the degree of skill demanded of him
is likely to be greater than that required of his counterpart some years ago.
94 Cadbury Report, King II Report
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executive directors have a serVIce contract under which they work full time for the
cOInpany.95 The King Conlnlission identified four distinct functions as pali of non-
executive directors' duties. They need to bring their special expertise and knowledge to
bear on the strategy, enterprise, iml0vative ideas and business planning of the cOlnpany.
Secondly, they can Inonitor and review the performance of the non-executive management
more objectively than the executive directors. Thirdly, they can play a role in resolving
conflict of interest situations, for eXalnple, the relnuneration of executives, succession and
hostile take-overs. Fourthly, they can act as a check and balance against the executive
directors. 96
In view of the ilnportance of their role, the conlmittee recolnmends that, whilst recognizing
the shortage of trained and experienced people to be appointed directors in South Africa
and even if the chair is an independent non-executive director, no board should have less
than two non-executive directors of sufficient calibre that their views will can)' weight in
board decisions. 97
2.1 DIRECTORS FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In accordance with the common law principles derived from the English law, it is accepted
that directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the COlnpany they serve. 98 These duties
exist in addition to the various statutory duties contained in the Conlpanies Act. 99 Company
directors generally owe these fiducial)' duties to the cOlnpany as a whole. Our common law
requires that the directors of a company should act bona fide and in the best interests of the
cOlnpany.100 The entity to which the directors owe fiduciary duties is conlmonly described
as 'the company as a whole' which is interpreted as the shareholders collectively, 'all the
shareholders, present and future', and the company as a separate legal entity
95 Hahlo, 327; King II par 2.4.3 of the Code
96 King I par 4.8
97 King I par 19,6.3
98 T Wixley & G Everingham (Note 45 above), 25
99 J McLennan 'Directors' Fiduciwy Duties and the Company's Act' (1983) SALJ 417 provides a
comprehensive list of director's statutory duties.
100 C'll' . & B d nd
1 lels ena e Corforate Law 2 ed (1992), 156; Gower LCB Company Law Cower's Principles of
Modern Company Law 511 ed (1992)
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respectively. 101 Modern Inanagement takes the VIew that company directors should
consider not only the interests of present and future shareholder's but also those of certain
I bl ' 102 I .other interest groups and, possibly, those of the State and the genera pu lC. t IS
subn1itted nonetheless, that, director's fiduciary duties remain owed to the cOlnpany and
that the existing principles of company law adequately address this issue. However,
director's compliance with fiduciary obligations cannot be evaluated without taking
cognizance of all surrounding circulnstances. It is logical to balance the interests of
different stakeholder groups, which include creditors, and en1ployees of the company
against the duties owed by the directors to the company as a whole. The director who
breaches these duties is personally held liable to the cOlnpany.103 A breach of these
fiduciary duties enables the COlnpany or shareholders to sue the wrongdoers in terms of the
COlnmon law derivative action or in terms of the statutory derivative action provided for by
section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
In South Africa and the UK, executive remuneration can potentially be challenged in the
courts on the basis that pay has been determined in a mam1er constituting a breach of the
duties of care, loyalty and good faith owed to a con1pany by its directors. J 04 In this context,
the issue is whether any men1ber can sue on the basis that the amount awarded as executive
relnuneration is prejudicial to the interests of the COlnpany as a whole. By paying
themselves huge salary packages, it is sublnitted that the directors do no longer act in the
best interests of the company and this frustrates their duty to n1axitnize shareholder value.
It is contended that there are lilnits to the generosity of companies to their elnployees: the
stage can be reached when it has to be detennined whether generosity goes beyond what is
in the interests of the company.l05 A notable instance is the case where the con1pany's
perfolmance has declined drastically, and the share price has pltu11meted, but company
directors are still awarded excessive bonuses and severance packages for those exiting
office in reckless disregard of the company's performance. Thus, the solution is that the
101 Havenga MK 'Fiducimy duties ofcompany directors wWz specific regard to corporate opportunities'
(1998) University of the Orange Free State (Doctoral Thesis)
102 M Havenga 'The company, the constitution, and the stakeholders' 1997 (5) Juta's Business Law, 134;
King II
103 J McLelman 'Directors' Fiducimy Duties and the Comnanies Act' 417
104 . r ,
BR Cheffms Company law theOly structure and operation, 665
105 J McLennan 'Misapplication ofcompany funds', 655
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directors' interests be linked to those of shareholders by requiring that their pay be linked
to their performance.
Not only can the directors be held to be in breach of their fiduciary duties in this instance,
but the director Inay, also be held liable for datnages under the general principles of the law
of delict to the company and its Inembers where the director has acted negligently in the
execution of his duties and thereby causing financial loss to the COlnpany and its members
whose shares have diminished in value as a result of that negligence. l06 As Williams
indicates, this liability arises not out of the general fiduciary duties owed to the cOlnpany
but arise out of the director's general duties under the law of delict, which duties are owed
to society as a whole. 107 In McLelland v Hullet and others, plaintiffs claim arose out of the
defendant's failure in their capacities as directors of a company of which the plaintiff was
both a director and shareholder, to carry out an undeliaking to acquire certain land on
behalf of the company, thereby causing the value of the plaintiffs interest in the company
to be diminished. It was held that because it was inevitable that the defendants would have
foreseen that plaintiff s shareholding would diminish in value as a result of their decision
and they had a duty to nlake sure that paY111ent was Inade. It was indicated that a reasonable
person in the position of the defendants would have performed the duty and prevented the
haml frOln occurring. The considerations which justified a conclusion that the defendants
conduct in relation to the plaintiff should be regarded as unlawful were that the defendants
conduct was prinla facie unlawful in the sense that it was a wrong cOlnmitted against the
company, the defendants being bound by a legal duty in favour of the company to avert the
hann which flowed from their wrong and being liable to be sued by the company on their
failure to do so.
Using the same analogy, one can intimate that where the company perfonllance
degenerates, and the board of directors still get to award excessive relnuneration packages
to directors, they should be held negligibly liable as they ought to foresee the loss the
conlpany and shareholders would likely suffer as a result of their negligent act of awarding
106 McLelland v Hullet 1992 1 SA 456 (D) 464
107 RC Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 21ld ed (1997) 152
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excessive salary pays. Obviously, where parachute handshakes alnongst other cOlnponents
of executive relnuneration are awarded, pure economic loss is suffered as a greater portion
of cOlnpany Inonies is utilized, which directly ilnpact negatively on the share price and
shareholder return. Inasn1uch as negligence on the part of the directors is ratifiable in telIDS
of the law, where the director obtains a benefit at the expense of the company, such acts
cannot be condoned, as they constitute a fraud on the minority. It follows therefore that
where exorbitant packages are awarded, directors stand to personally benefit ilnlnensely
and these wrongs cam10t be ratified - They have to reimburse back the monies they
acquired for then1selves back to the company.
It is recognized that a director owes fiduciary duties with the result that he has the duty to
act in good faith towards the company, to exercise his duties of care and skill, to exercise
his powers as a director for the benefit of the COlnpany, and to avoid a conflict of interest
between his own interests and those of the con1pany.l08 In the event of a breach of fiduciary
duties, the directors are to be held liable to the con1pany for any damages, which it
sustained as a result. 109 Directors are also regarded as having SOlne of the attributes of
trustees, notably as regards assets of the con1pany, which are in their hands or under their
control. 110
FrOln the above, it can be seen that directors' fiduciary duties are in1portant for the purpose
of executive ren1uneration in that in their detennination of executive remuneration, the
directors have to weigh the two interests together and work within what is essentially in the
best interests of the c0111pany. While it is generally left to the generallneeting to detennine
the remuneration packages of directors qua directors, the detennination of the remuneration
of the Inanaging director and other full time executive directors is aln10st invariably left to
the board. Even though a director cannot take part in the deliberations of the board when it
considers his own service contract, this Ineans that in effect the top executives detennine
their own relnuneration. 111 Awarding excessive relTIuneration packages that cannot be
108 Cilliers & Benade (note 45 above), 139
109 RC Williams (note 102 above), 153
110 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn GhwGno 1981 (2) SA 173 198
I1I 'Blythe v The Phoenix Foundry Ltd 1922 WLD 87
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aligned to their performance amounts to a breach of their fiduciary duties. As such, in the
event of such excess mnounts being awarded, the cOlnpany is wronged and has a right to a
clain1 in dmnages against the beneficiaries or directors. The company can utilize remedies
provided under the law to recoup back these n10nies. They should not lose sight of these
fiduciary duties and their duty to exercise skill and care in the detennination of directors
pay packages.
Various duties arise from the fiduciary relationship between directors and the cOlnpany.
2.1.2 EXERCISE OF POWERS IN GOOD FAITH
The parmnount duty of directors is to act bona fide in what they consider to be in the best
interests of the con1pany.112 It is left to the directors in the exercise of their business
judgment to decide how the interests of the company may best be pron10ted. The courts
will interfere only if no reasonable director could have concluded that a particular course of
action was in the interests of the company. I 13
2.2.2 AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DUTY
Directors are required not to put themselves in a position where there is, or Inay be, a
conflict between their personal interests and their duties to the con1pany.114 A possibility of
conflicting interest will be found where the reasonable man considering the relevant facts
and circumstances of the particular case would think that there is a real possibility of
conflict. lls One of the most significant and obvious conflicts of interest which directors
face is in the setting of their ren1uneration. It was indicated earlier that Table A of the
COlnpanies Act provides that the board Inay detem1ine the remuneration of the Inanaging
and executive directors. In South Africa, it has to be determined whether this is indeed the
Il2Ibid
113 Sehulze H 'Breach ofa fiduciary duty by a director ofa company' (1995) De Rebus Issue 335,699
114 Havenga 'Fiduciary duties' 1995 SA Mere LJ 435; Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd
1921 AD 177
115 Boardnwn and Another v Phipps (1967) 2 AC 46 (HL)
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right approach to adopt or not. Another typical example where a conflict of interest and
duty may suffice would be of directors holding directorships in competing companies.
Cross-directorships entail that a director in one company Inay sit as a non-executive
director in another company. It would mean therefore that in setting renluneration
packages, such director is effectively setting their own remuneration pay based on what
other executive directors in other cOlnparable companies eanl. While it is acknowledged
that as the Listing Requirements stipulate, that 'no director should be involved in deciding
his or her own remuneration', 116 its effectiveness renlains very questionable when regard is
had to the fact that the ultimate decision or say on directors' reInuneration rests with the
board of directors, the Inenlbers of which are colleagues of a director who Inay have
recused himself or herself in order to enable his or her individual pay package to be
discussed and decided in his or her absence. It seelns to nle that the directors end up giving
their colleagues high pay increases in the hope that when it is their tunl, these colleagues
would be equally or reciprocally generous. Obviously, the absence of such a director when
a determination of his or her pay is made does not really make a difference as to the
package he or she will ultinlately get. The absence of a director in the discussions of his or
her remuneration has not seen any narrowing of the pay gap between directors and other
rank elnployees. Neither has it led to the cUIiailment of renluneration packages.
With the recent corporate refonlls, it is believed that disclosure and accountability to
shareholders in this area is essential. However, it is subnlitted that it does not prevent or do
away with directors engaging or doing away with directors' conflicting interests in this
regard.
2.2.3 SECRET PROFITS
As espoused above, a company director has no right to reIlluneration unless such right is
. I' b h . I 117gIven to 1lm y t e artlc es or contractually. The cOInpany may recuperate any other
116 Para 22.7.10
117 Hahlo (note above), 369
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pecuniary gain received by a director. I 18 A director's use of corporate assets in order to
make a secret profit for himself is clearly a breach of his fiduciary duties. 119 In Robinson v
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,120 Robinson was chairman of the respondent
company and he attenlpted unsuccessfully to purchase the farm for the company. Later
onwards, he bought the fann for £60,000 through an agent and sold it shortly afterwards to
a subsidiary of the conlpany for £275 000. The court ordered him to repay the profit of
£215 000 made by him. He could have possibly avoided this had he made full disclosure to
the company and the COlnpany had agreed to it.
In Regal Hastings Ltd v Gulliver,121 the House of Lords held that the directors were liable
to account if it was established that what they did was so related to the affairs of the
company that it could properly be said to have been done in the course of their
management and in utilization of their opportunities and special knowledge as directors,
and that this had also resulted in a profit to themselves. The test for accountability as stated
by Lord Porter was that
One occupying a position of trust must not 111ake a profit, which he can acquire only
by use of his fiduciary position, or if he does, he Inust account for the profits so
made. 122
According to this fonnulation, therefore, it would seeln that a director would be liable for
any benefit acquired by virtue of his office, whether or not the advantage was acquired in
the exercise of that office. Liability arises in this instance, if the benefit was acquired by
virtue of the director's office as well as in the exercise of that office. In some jurisdictions,
directors have been held accountable for profits made as a result of their use of the
company's propeliy or facilities, and for profits made by them on the resale of shares,
which they acquired by using their positions, or issued to themselves. 123 It is Sublllitted
118 Ibid




123 TParteer v McKenna (1874) 10 Ch App 96
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herein that, there is merit in the strict application of this rule in respect of large public
cOITIpanies, whose directors are well-paid fiduciaries.
. h 124 A . 1Directors have to account for the ITIOney and shares that are gIven to t enl. stnct ru e
can have the positive effect of encouraging thenl to do their best for their companies. Since
the prohibition is, in any event, only against secret profits, the director is relieved of any
possibility of a breach of duty if disclosure is made to and approval is obtained in a general
Ineeting. However, it is subInitted that, as shall be seen hereunder, disclosure does not
necessarily curtail excessive pay packages.
Cilliers et al indicates that a director Inay obtain no other advantage from his office than
that to which he is entitled by way of director's remuneration. 125 It is submitted that
exorbitant remuneration awards constitute an advantage to which a director is not entitled.
The directors' awarding themselves exorbitant pay packages that are not aligned to
perfonnance can be equated to the duty against making secret profits in the sense that the
packages they award theITIselves are in fact, shareholder Inonies, or COlnpany monies,
which the cOlnpany is deprived of. The directors are in fact, depriving the company of its
corporate oppoliunity, which rightfully belongs to the company. Such awards should be
regarded as breaches of fiduciary duty in the above context. It is submitted that pay that is
not aligned to perfonl1ance is tantmTIount to advantages that directors Inay not obtain for
thelnselves, as these are over and above what they are rightfully entitled to by virtue of
holding their directorship positions. Boards of directors should therefore be made to
account for each and every cOInponent in each director's package, and whether or not it is
indeed justifiable.
FUlihennore, it was pointed out earlier that directors are regarded as trustees of company
property, which is in their custody and under their control. 126 Accordingly, the company
may claim the property fronl the 'delinquent directors', or Inay claim any 'profit' the
director may have made as a result of their breach of duty, or damages in respect of any
124 Havenga M 'Director's fiduciary duties under our future company law regime' 1997 (9) SA Mere LJ 310
125 Cilliers &Benade (Note 45 above), 141
126 Larkin M 'Thefiduciary duties ofthe company director' 1979 (2) SAL] 11
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loss thereby caused to the cOlnpany.127 The board of directors can then be sued on the basis
that they wrongly acquired for thelnselves the share of profits of the company, which they
could not validly claiIn. It is sublnitted here that such awards constitute unjust emichn1ents
on the directors' part. 128 It is n1aintained here that directors should not be placed in
positions of potential conflict of duty and self-interest. 129 Their services to the COlnpany do
not go um-ewarded and therefore, liability should be attached should they award excessive
relnuneration packages. They must be held liable in dalnages to the company for any' loss'
the COlnpany suffered in consequence of their acts. The recovery of the profit that they
Inade must be recovered on the basis that the director is accountable to the cOlnpany.130
Note should be taken that the directors need not be acting dishonestly in awarding
exorbitant remuneration packages. Professor Naude' observes that directors can abuse their
powers even when they act in the honest belief that they are doing what is for the good of
the company.131 They Inust act honestly, but honesty is not sufficient. The courts adopt an
objective approach in this regard. In Re W & M Roith Ltd,132 the controlling director
shareholder organized an anangement in telIDS of which the company would pay a life
pension to his widow. No suggestion of bad faith was Inade on his part; nonetheless, the
transaction was ultiInately struck down on the basis that it was intended to operate solely
for the benefit of the widow and not the company. In the same breath, where there is a
measure of self-interest in the conclusion of excessive relnuneration deals that are meant to
personally benefit the directors and not shareholders or the COlnpany as a whole, such pay
packages should be struck down on the Salne basis. It is submitted that it is against the
spirit of corporate governance for board melnbers to jointly pass a vote for such deals while
aware that there exists no alignment of pay and perfonnance of individual directors.
127 Robinson v Randfontein Estates gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168, 179
128 J McLennan 'Company Directors - Fiducim)J Duties} (1989) 1 SA Merc LJ 123, 129
129 Means of avoiding unjust emichment by directors will be discussed in Chapter 4
130 J McLelman 'Company Directors - Fiducim)! Duties' (note above), 131
131 As quoted in McLennan ' Misapplication ofcompany funds - a proposal for reform}} 651
l32 (1967) ALL ER 427
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2.3 MECHANISIMS IN THE LAW THAT MAY CURTAIL AND AFFECT
EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
With the obvious abuse emanating from the fact that directors effectively set their own pay,
and that meInbers have some control over their fees, meInbers previously had no control
whatsoever over the total eInoluments paid to a director in the fOIm of salaries, bonuses,
contributions to pension schemes and compensation for loss of office. In the old regime,
nlenlbers could just make reliance on the infonnation they penlsed in annual financial
statenlents and there was not nluch that they could do except to complain at the AGM that
the remuneration packages were grossly excessive and that the enl0luInents of the chainnan
and chief executive were obscene. 133 In fact, directors could very easily vote theInselves
long tenn service agreements in the case of executive directors, and generous contracts for
consulting and similar services in the case of non-executives. The Companies Act imposes
sonle restrictions on directors who liberally assess their own worth and services, and set
their own pay.
2.3.1 RESTRICTIONS ON BENEFITS
2.3.1.1 THE COMPANIES ACT NO 21 OF 1973
In teITI1S of the Conlpanies Act, a few mechanisnls that deal with restrictions that may
ilnpact on executive pay are provided for. For instance, section 221 (1) of the Act restricts
the powers of directors to issue shares. The issue of shares by directors is made subject to
the prior approval of a generallneeting. 134 It provides that directors' powers with regard to
the allotInent or issuing of share capital can only be validated upon the company approving
to such proposal in a general meeting. Shareholders have a right to know how much is
being allotted by way of shares to directors and other parties and benefits and these have to
appear on the agenda of every annual general llleeting. 135 It should be noted however that
this restriction relates to the total benefits that meInbers nlay make; there is nothing to
133 PL Davies Gowers Principles ofModern Company Law 6th ed (1997), 630
134 Cilliers & Benade (note 45 above), 152
135 J McLelman 'Misapplication ofcompany funds: a proposal for reform', 658
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prevent meInbers froln specifying maXImUIn amounts that may be given to individual
beneficiaries. 136
Furtheml0re, in terms of this section, it is clear that directors caml0t in any way issue
shares to themselves as a way of cOlnpensating themselves without prior authority to do so
from the COInpany. This however, does not in any way curtail the granting of excessive
remuneration to directors. This section does not impede directors exercising their share
options. It does not seeIn that this section will linlit or play a crucial role in curtailing
exorbitant executive cOInpensation.
The other restriction provided for in terms of the Act is section 222 (l) (a), which linlits the
issuing of shares and debentures to directors. The issue of shares by directors to thenlselves
and their beneficiaries may only take place in very limited circunlstances. 137 Directors are
precluded from allotting shares to other directors or their nominees, or to a body corporate
which acts on the instructions of a director, or at a general meeting where a director holds
more than 20 per cent of the voting rights unless approval has been sought froln the
COInpany in a general meeting. 138 This proviso does not as well seenl to work towards
constricting excessive remuneration packages because directors can justify hefty share
allotnlents before meInbers in a general Ineeting who as practice has shown, never really
query such allotnlents.
Furthernl0re, as already mentioned, the cOInpany Inay decide to aSSIgn directors share
options. In tenllS of section 223, directors can only validly subscribe for share options if it
can be established that they received no undue preference, or if approval is Inade by a
136 Ibid. There is nothing that precludes members from stipulating the maximum amounts that may be given
to directors. It might just as well be a good idea if the Act were to require not only disclosure, but also
scrutiny and justification over benefits exceeding a specified amount in any given year.
137 Cilliers & Benade (note 45 above), 152
138 Or unless such shares are allotted under an underwriting agreement (Sec 222( 1)(b)); or unless the shares
allotted are in proportion to existing holdings and on the same terms and conditions as apply to other
shareholders (Sec 222 (l)(c)); or unless the shares allotted are offered on the same terms and conditions as to
members of the public (Sec 222 (1)(d))
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special resolution, or where the right is given to a salaried director in his capacity as an
139 h . . d hemployee of the cOInpany. T e provIsIon rea s t at
No option or right given directly or indirectly to any director or future director of a
company in terms of any schelne or plan, to subscribe for any shares of that
conlpany. " on any basis other than that laid down in section 222 (1 ) (c) 140, shall be
valid unless authorized in telTI1S of a special resolution of that company. The
provisions to this section read as follows
(a) the term 'future director' shall not include a person who becomes a director of
the company after the lapse of six Inonths from the date upon which such option
or right is acquired by such person; and
(b) no such option or right shall be invalid in tenns of this section if such director or
future director of the company holds salaried elnploylnent or office in the
conlpany and is given such right in his capacity as an elnployee.
It is clear that directors can only be afforded share options upon the special resolution being
granted. Note is taken that the requirement for a special resolution does not apply to
executive directors since they are enlployees of the cOlnpany and the right to share options
is given to them in their capacity as employees through their service agreements. It follows
therefore that the passing of a resolution does not act as a serious obstnlction to a company
awarding generous share options. Instead, special resolutions Inight be made in order just to
try and lure and retain talented executives. 141
The other relevant provision is section 227 that relates to the paylnent to directors for loss
of office or in connection with schemes of anangenlents and takeovers. It prohibits a
company fronl paying a past director or retiring director (or director of its subsidiary or
holding cOlnpany) any benefit for loss of office or in cOllilection with their retireInent fronl
139 Cilliers & Benade (note 45 above), 152
140 It provides that if the shares allotted are in proportion to existing holdings and on the same telms and
conditions as apply to other shareholders
141 King II; Mongalo, 240
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office, unless full details are disclosed to the lnelnbers and approved by special resolution.
However, in terms of section 227(6), 'this provision does not apply with reference to any
bona fide payment made or benefit or advantage granted by way of damages for breach of
contract or by way of a pension, including any superaru1uation allowance, gratuity or
sin1ilar payment in respect of past services'. It follows therefore that the con1pany would
still have to pay a departing director a golden handshake and in such a case, no special
resolution would necessarily have to be passed. 142
It is sublnitted that to deter abuse in cases where the COlnpany is not in a position to bargain
at am1's length, not only n1ust there be disclosure, but insider transactions such as those
above lnust be made susceptible to liability. The court would then have to view these
transactions in an objective marmer; ifit is satisfied that the transaction constitutes an abuse
of the process, it could then avail the company a ren1edy. Often, in order to lure and retain
competent executive directors, attractive benefits are awarded but these are given by way
of contracts in their capacity as elnployees. As such, hefty packages can be awarded
notwithstanding the fact that the directors concerned are not perfonning beyond expected
levels. It is submitted that awarding excessive ren1uneration to directors that is not aligned
at all to performance constitutes such abuse as advocated by McLelu1an. 143
Last but not least, the Con1panies Act precludes a board of directors from selling most of a
company's assets unless shareholders agree in a generallneeting. It lnakes provision for the
non-disposal of the undertaking or a greater part of assets of the COlnpany in telms of
section 228. This section calls for those Inaking decisions to carefully consider the best
interests of the cOlnpany.144 The directors do not have powers to dispose of the whole or the
greater pari of the assets of the con1pany. This section is problematic because the directors
can still sell the assets of the cOlnpany one by one, and it would not be possible to say that,
at any tin1e, they were disposing of the whole or a greater part of the assets. Thus, they
142 Similar provisions in the UK are made: Section 312-315 of the UK Companies Act makes provision for
these exceptions
143 J McLennan 'Misapplication ofcompany funds', 660
144 J McLemlan , Director Fiducimy Duties', 438
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would not need any approval of shareholders in such a case. 145 It would appear that if
directors sell the assets in consecutive transactions one by one at anyone tin1e, it would not
be possible to say that they were disposing of the whole or the greater part of the assets. As
such, they do not require the approval of men1bers, but if they sell the assets all in one go,
the have no power to do so without a resolution of luelubers. 146 In a large listed public
con1pany, it is doubtful whether one can safely say exorbitant remuneration packages
constitute the whole or the greater part of the assets of the company.147 This is so because
invariably, the pay packages do not account for a greater percentage of the cOlupanies'
assets.
DISCLOSURE OF REMUNERATION PACKAGES IN ANNUAL FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
In terms of Section 286 of the Companies Act, a company is required to prepare its
financial accounts on an annual basis, which have to indicate the aggregate amount of
compensation paid to directors. The stateluent has to disclose en101uments received by
directors in terms of Section 297, which include directors' fees, bonuses, salary and
expense allowances. The aluount of pensions paid or receivable by directors and past
directors and cOlupensation paid to present and past directors and details of directors'
service contracts in terms of section 289 have to be set out as well. These financial
statements have to be presented before shareholders annual general meeting. However,
even though the Companies Act clearly 111akes provision for such disclosures, the spiraling
remuneration packages of directors over the years show that these sections have not really
had any effect on decreasing the wage gap and directors pay that is not aligned to
perfon11ance. In essence, cOlllpanies seelU to be engaged in a box ticking exercise or rather
do so out of cOlupliance with the rules rather than with the spirit of the section. Disclosure
does not at all oblige directors to consider the interests of shareholders given the facts that
it is left in their hands what luatters to report on. In any event, even with the advent of
145 Ibid, 439
146 JS McLennan 'Directors Fiduciary duties and the Companies Act' 1983 SALJ 417,439
147 J McLennan, 'Directors fiduciary duties and the Companies Act', 438
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corporate law reforms (I(ing II), directors are only expected to report on relTIuneration
policies but are not obliged to implen1ent such processes. ]48
Section 297 (l) - (10) of the COlTIpanies Act stipulates that there should be full detailed
disclosure of the total directors elnolmnents and pensions paid or received by the directors,
the an10unts of any compensation paid to directors and past directors in respect of loss of
office and details of directors service contracts in the annual financial staten1ents. This
section focuses on ensuring adequate disclosure so that shareholders have sufficient
information available to make infonned decisions regarding remuneration. The
recommendation by King Con1mittee on corporate governance that there should be full and
clear disclosure of the total of executive and non-executive director's earnings broken
down into headings describing the nature of the cOlnpensation has led to the an1endn1ent of
this section. 149 However, while disclosure of individual remuneration packages has been
adequate, the existing South African best practice frarnework and Inechanislns have not led
to satisfactory disclosure of remuneration policies. Argulnents have been leveled that
Inandating detailed disclosures Inay ultin1ately result in increased cOlupensation levels. For
instance, despite the relatively comprehensive and long standing American and UK
disclosure requirements, American executive pay is the highest in the world. 150 In the South
African context, there has really been no evidence to show that disclosure of ren1uneration
packages in annual financial statements works towards curbing exorbitant pay being
awarded. For this reason, it would seeln that section 297 does not assist in the curtailn1ent
of hefty ren1uneration packages.
The relnuneration is to be the subject of recomlnendations to the board of the proposed
remuneration cOlnlnittee. ]51 The chairperson of the comn1ittee is expected to attend all
AGM's in order to answer all questions put forward by the members. In England, the
Cadbury Committee and Greenbury COlnmittee n1ade silnilar recolnn1endations.
148 T Mongalo 'Two steps forward, one step back: Directors' duty to act for the benefit ofthe company
revisited in the aftermath ofcorporate governance reforms' (Unpublished article) 1 14
149 'Section 197 (lA)(a)
150 PLC Global Counsel 'Executive compensation disclosure in Germany, the UK and the US' October 2002
Vol VII Number 8,30
151 King Il, para 2.5.4
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2.3.1.2 STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION IN
THEUK
2.3.1.3 THE UK COMPANIES ACT 1985
Section 318 and 319 of the UK COlnpanies Act ilnpose restraints on the liberality on
directors' fees. Section 318 requires that every COlnpany has to keep a copy of the service
agreen1ent of each director of the company or its subsidiary or a lnelnorandum of its tenns
if the agreelnent is in writing. 152 The Inen10randun1 has to be kept at the registered office or
principal place of business, 153 and copies of which lnust be made open to inspection by any
melnber of the company without any charge. 154 However, rights of inspection are never
really used in practice even in the case of public companies. This right is lilnited to
men1bers and one can argue that if it were extended to elnployees as well, whose interests
the directors are expected to protect in their exercise of their duties to the company, then,
disclosure requirements would be met to an extend and it would deal with the abuse
flowing froln board members having control of their own relnuneration. However, it does
not seem as if this section works towards cUliailing excessive awards of relnuneration as
practice has shown that n1elnbers hardly ever utilize this option.
Section 319, on the other hand, appears to be lnore effective. It precludes any term that
would stipulate that 'any director eluployed whether under a contract of service or for
services, which may last for n10re than 5 years without being tenninable by the con1pany or
ten11inable only in specified circull1stances unless the telTIl is first approved by a resolution
of the company in a general lneeting. 155 In recent years, lnelnbers in a general n1eeting do






directors reach retirelnent age or later. 156 However, rolling contracts do not seem to fall
within the ambit of the section, which contracts when if telminated by the company, will
always have about five years to run.
Section 312 is another ilnportant provIsIon that precludes directors from awarding
then1selves hefty packages. It provides that shareholders must give their approval before
the company provides ex gratia payInents to a director on leaving office. However, this
provision is not applicable where a director is entitled to benefits elnanating froIn a
contractual agreement. As such, the board cannot be restricted in awarding payments to a
departing executive as part of a settlen1ent under which he agrees to forego the right to sue
for dmnages for breach of his unexpired service contract.
Furthermore, Schedule 6 of the Act contains provisions that require that disclosure to
shareholders and the public of directors' remuneration is to be included in the director's
report. 157 Section 325(3) requires that the register of directors' interests should be kept and
must contain infolmation about share options that may have been granted to directors.
Disclosure does not seem to be providing the solution to the probleln. Directors still seeln
to be awarding thelnselves generous salaries and share option packages even though the
con1panies they are running may not be performing'over the odds' and Inay not necessarily
require any great entrepreneurial flair. 158 This provision has not proven to be effective at all
in cUliailing exorbitant pay packages.
2.3.1.3 UK'S RECENT REFORMS ON DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
With regard to the disclosure of cOlnpensation of executive directors, the cOlnpany's mIDual
accounts must be availed to alllnelnbers prior to or at each AGM. In tenns of Section 241
of the UK Companies Act 1985, the board is expected to disclose the total ren1uneration
payable to all directors, including any amounts received under executive service contracts.
156 PL Davies (note 130 above), 631
157 Ibid, 632
158 One may find that the company actually needs a rigorous cutting of costs, notably the dismissal of
significant numbers of employees.
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The accounts nlust state the full pay of the chairman, the number of directors falling within
specified bands of remuneration and any conlpensation nlade to a director for loss of office.
It should be noted that the Act does not nlandate that individual director's pay be provided.
Neither does it require that a breakdown of the constituent parts of each director's
remuneration package be nlade. The UK govenl1nent found these provisions lacking and
recently fonnulated regulations that supplelnent current legislation.
The new UK directors' renluneration disclosure requirements are contained in the
Directors' Remuneration Report regulations 2002 (the DRR Regulations), which have
amended the disclosure requirements of the Conlpanies Act, including an insertion of a
new Schedule 7A. 159 These requirelnents are also contained in the COlnpanies (Sulnlnary
Financial Statements) AJnendlnent Regulations 2002, which amend the Companies
(Summary Financial Statelnents) Regulations 1995, and require that sunlmary financial
statelnents include certain of the new remuneration disclosures. These amendlnents build
on the current law regulation and best practices that are set out in the UK Companies Act
1985, the UK Listing Rules and the UK Combined Code of Principles of Good Govenlance
and Code of Best Practice. In addition to preparing the director's relnuneration report, a
company must continue to comply with paragraph 1 of Part I, and all of Parts II and III of
Schedule 6 to the Companies Act, which require disclosure in the notes to the cOlnpany's
annual account of the aggregate anlount of director's emoluments, loans to directors and
other transactions between a director and the company.
The new legislation mandates that all public quoted cOlnpanies nlust produce a directors'
relTIuneration report as part of their annual reporting cycle. The renluneration report only
requires disclosure of directors' remuneration. Unlike the US approach, calls to extend the
new law to senior managers of public companies were rejected. 160 In tellllS of section 244
of the Companies Act, the report by the board of directors has to be prepared and published
within the tilTIe frame as the quoted company's annual report and accounts. It then has to be
tabled before the cOlnpany's shareholders; debenture holders and other persons entitled to
159 J Baird, P Stowasser 'Executive Compensation d;sc1osure requirements: The German, UK and US
approaches', PLC Global Counsel (2002) 7 (8), 32
160 Ibid, 32
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receive notice of general meetings in terms of section 238 of the Act. The report has to be
placed before an am1ual 'advisory' sl}areholder vote in tenns of section 241A of the
COlnpanies Act. The remuneration report has to include a forward-looking stateInent of
policy on directors' ren1uneration. This is an expansion on the existing obligation in the UK
Listing Rules (Para 12.43A(c)), as it requires certain specific disclosures as part of the
policy stateInent. In particular, a detailed SUInn1ary of the perforn1ance conditions
applicable to share options and long-tenn incentive schen1es entitlements for each
individual director and an explanation of why they were chosen; a SUInmary and
explanation of the methods to be utilized in assessing whether the perfonnance conditions
are met. The requireInents also mandate that an explanation be given if any director's
entitlement to share options or under long incentive schemes is not subject to satisfaction of
a perfonnance condition.
The new requirements also obligate that any significant amendment proposed to be n1ade to
the tenns and conditions of any director's entitlen1ent to share options or long tenn
incentive plans be reported on. In addition, details of any cOInparator COlnpany in the same
industry that is used in detem1ining perfon11ance conditions for share options or long
incentive plans should be Inade. An explanation of the relative ilnportance of the elements
of a director's ren1uneration that are, and are not, perfonnance related have to be disclosed.
The statement of policy lTIUSt also cover in SUITImary fonn, an explanation of the cOlnpany's
policies regarding the duration of, and notice periods and tern1ination paylnents under,
directors' service contracts. It is impoliant to also note that exclusion of infonnation
regarding perfol111ance criteria for share options and long tenn incentive schen1es is not
pennissible on grounds that the information is C01111nercially confidential. 161 Disclosure of
perfol111ance criteria for annual bonus awards is not required, although best practice is to
make such disclosure. This is indeed a significant developn1ent in the regulation of
executive remuneration.
Last but not least, the new regulations mIrror the US approach and stipulate that the
relnuneration report Inust include a perfonnance graph which shows the total shareholder
161 Schedule 7A, paragraph 3
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return for the preceding five financial years for a holding of shares of the class of the
quoted company's equity share capital whose listing or adlnission to dealing has resulted in
the company falling within the definition of 'quoted company'.
Disclosure of sums receivable in respect of the relevant financial year whenever paid and
sums paid in the relevant financial year if not received in respect of any period has to be
made. Schedule 7A, paragraph 1(2) stipulates that information reported on a specific
person must be shown in a manner that links the information to the particular person by
nan1e.
Most significantly, it should be noted that the relnuneration report is subjected to audit in
terms of Schedule 7A, Part 3. The auditors have to repoli on the levels of non-con1pliance
and any inconsistencies between the infonnation audited and the company's audited
accounts. A disclosure of all emollunents and con1pensation details must be provided. The
salaries, fees, bonuses and any other allowances the director is entitled to have to be
disclosed. In the event of resignation, cOlnpensation for loss of office and any other
payments made in connection to the telmination of qualifying services has to be made.
With regard to share options, disclosure of details of options held at the begim1ing and end
of the relevant financial year has to be made; in each case a differentiation of options
having different terms and conditions has to be made; and n10st importantly, any
perfonnance criteria upon which the award or exercise of an option is conditional,
including a description of any variation to the performance criteria during the year. A
cOlnprehensive detail of long-term incentive schemes held by each director at the
COlnn1encement of the financial year and end has to be availed. The report has to capture
and identify schelne interests awarded, varied and vested during the year under review. The
values involved and their form, the dates of appointlnent and cessation as director have to
be succinctly outlined. Other ilnportant infonnation that relates to remuneration packages
has to be captured as well. 162
162 This includes any infonnatioll on amounts pertaining to retirement benefits paid to or receivable by such
persons in excess of the retirement benefits to which he or she was entitled on the later of 31 sI March 1997
44
The company nlust avail details of the servIce contracts of all directors; the dates,
unexpired tenns and notice periods of the service contracts of any person who has served as
a director during the relevant financial year nlust be provided. Details of any significant
awards to any past director of the conlpany during the relevant financial year and provision
for compensation payable on early termination nlust be described. The contractual ternlS
and conditions attached that are necessary in estinlating the liability of the cOIupany in the
event of early termination have to be disclosed. 163
Companies are still however, expected to comply with some of the pre existing disclosure
requireInents. A indicated earlier, Schedule 6 of the Act contains provisions that require
that disclosure to shareholders and the publics of directors' remuneration be included in the
director's report. 164 Section 325(3) requires that the register of directors' interests should be
kept and must contain information about share options that Inay have been granted to
directors.
In tenllS of section 241 A of the new legislation, which basically reiterates the existing
requireInents under Chapter 13 of the Listing RequireInents for shareholder votes to
approve enlployee share scheIues and long-ternl incentive plans; the relnuneration repoli
IUUSt be put to a shareholder vote at the annual general nleeting of the conlpany. The vote
taken is advisory in nature and is therefore not binding on the board of directors. It protects
the company froln negative votes that nlay affect existing contractual compensation
entitlelnents. Moreover, it is unlikely that directors could agree to sign contractual
agreelnents with salary packages that are conditional upon shareholder approval. It is
submitted that it does not really assist the situation in any way because the conlpany itself
would be very concenled by the lllessages sent by a negative vote. The Board of directors
and the date on which the benefits first became payable (Schedule 7A, paragraph /3). Significant awards to
persons who had previously been directors of the company including for loss of office (Schedule 7A,
paragraph j 4) and any director's accrued benefits and transfer values under defined benefit pension schemes,
and contributions paid or payable by the company on behalf of a director to money purchase pension schemes
(Schedule 7A, paragraph 12). Sums paid to a third party in respect of a director's services have to be
disclosed as well. (Schedule 7A, paragraph 15)
163 S 1chedu e 7A, paragraph 5
164 Ibid, 632
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can always motivate why the packages are so high and even though active shareholders
may strike down excessive packages but often, often, they engage in a box ticking exercise.
It's only recently that we have seen a few cOlnpanies failing to vote on packages that they
felt were not aligned to perfonnance. 165 Inasnluch as it would be more helpful for company
members to pass a vote on the remuneration report as whole, lnore focus should be luade
on the remuneration policy of the conlpany.
There are however a number of shortcolnings with regard to these new disclosure
requirements. It is felt that disclosure requirements should have been extended to public
company's senior management in order to provide a more fuller complete picture of the
company's compensation philosophy and to address any possible problenls caused by
senior managers refusing to accept board seats in order to avoid the disclosure
requirements. It is submitted herein that regardless of these new developlnents in the UK,
ne\vspaper reports received alIuost on daily basis bear evidence that excessive
remuneration packages awarded to directors are still being approved to date and are still
spiraling out of control. There is still no alignment of pay and perfonnance. The
amendnlents in the Act do not seenl to have had any luuch effect on inhibiting such awards.
2.3.1.4 US DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ITEM 402, REGULATION S-
K
Disclosure requirelnents are generally govell1ed and contained in Iteln 402 of the
Regulation S-K. In tenns of this regulation, tabulation of all compensatory benefits
accorded to directors must be set out cOlnprehensively in the annual financial statenlent for
the period under review. 166 Details of enlployn1ent contracts and other arrangelnents have
to be luade, insider participation, and a repOli by the cOlnpensation committee outlining the
reasons for their conlpensation decisions. Significantly, the board of directors has to avail a
report that describes the relationship between compensation and corporate performance.
The board has to include a perfonnance graph that outlines the c0111pany perfonnance on
165 GlaxoSmithKline case
166 J Baird, P Stowasser, 36
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the basis of shareholder return that is compared against the Inarket index in the same
industry. As in the case of South Africa and the UK, disclosure of relnuneration packages
has to be reported on an individual case for each executive director during each of the last
three fiscal years. The report is on the basis of base salary, bonuses and other aImual
compensation, long tenn incentive awards (LTIP) awards made, any other awards
including tennination paynlents, options granted including present base values to each
naIlled executive. An annual report outlining the company policy of the con1pensation
con1mittee, the relationship between corporate perfonnance and aggregate executive
compensation and the perfonnance measures that the conl1nittee considers in awarding
rellluneration has to be prepared. 167 Unlike the cOlnparable UK. requirenlents, the report is
. not required to discuss forward-looking compensation policy. It is also to note any
dissenting Inelnbers in decision reached by the cOllln1ittee and a sUlnmary of reasons for
such a dissenting decision, any modification or rejection by the board of directors of any
decision of the compensation committee. ..
The whole object of the Securities Exchange Conlmission (SEC) is said to be that
shareholders who are dissatisfied with executive compensation should vote, not litigate,168
The SEC issues 'comment letters' to conlpanies requiring rectification of cOlllpensation
committee reports that the SEC regards as unsatisfactory or deficient. Even though this
may be perceived as a good move in that the reports are highly scrutinized, the decisions of
cOlnpensation of executives are still left entirely in the hands of the con1pensation board,
and it does not seem as if these comn1ent letters would have any effect of striking down
excessive remuneration that is not aligned to perfonnance. There have not been nlany cases
that have been repolied in this regard. One can legitinlately question the efficacy of this
move given the fact that in the US, there has yet been no record of a cOlnpensation package





Notwithstanding the efforts made to try and pronl0te more transparency and disclosure
mechanisms, executive remuneration is still spiraling out of control. Disclosure does not
seem to be providing the solution to the problenl. Directors still seeln to be awarding
themselves generous salaries and share option packages even though the conlpanies they
are running Inay not be perfonning 'over the odds' and may not necessarily require any
great entrepreneurial flair. 169 These provisions have not proven to be effective at all in
cllliailing exorbitant pay packages.
From the above, it does not seenl as if the South African and the UK and the US
Companies Acts have succeeded in curtailing excessive relnuneration packages in public
conlpanies. It is submitted that the Acts do not in any way dissuade and prevent directors
receiving excessive remuneration packages. From these sections, it is clear that there is no
statutory provision which requires shareholders to approve directors' relnuneration or that
enables thenl to reduce relnuneration packages on the basis that the conlpany is simply
paying too lnuch.
2.3.2 JUDICIAL REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no provision that entitles the court to strike down
director's relnuneration on the basis that the package is too lnuch, there are some
circUlnstances where it is possible for relief to be granted as a result of cOlllplaints
, t' 170 I G ' S d 171 d' . h ' 1 .concernIng execu lve pay. n UlnlleSS v aun ers lrector WIt specla expertIse was
appointed a Inenlber of the cOlnnlittee of the directors to act for the COlnpany in connection
with a take over. The comlnittee agreed to the director's additional renluneration on tenus,
which enabled hiIn to claim and to be paid £5, 2 lnillion. The articles of the conlpany
provided that special relnuneration could be granted only by the full board, The court
ordered the director to retunl the remuneration to the conlpany on the basis that the
transaction was voidable at the instance of the company. As such the director and the
169 One may find that the company actually needs a rigorous cutting of costs, notably the dismissal of
significant numbers of employees.
170 T Mongalo, 223
171 (1990) 2 AC 663 (HL)
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cOlnpany had to be returned to their fonner positions. 172 It also considered that the director
was not entitled to be paid on a quantunl tneiruit basis, or otherwise. The leanled Lord
Tenlpleman had this to say
A shareholder is entitled to cornpliance with the atiicles. Atiicle 92 provides clearly
enough for the authority of the board of directors to be obtained for the payments of
special remuneration and the subnlissions made on behalf of Mr Ward, (the
director) .... are more ingenious than plausible and Inore legalistic than convincing.
This case indicates that in Inaking executive remuneration decisions, procedures in place
have to be followed nleticulously. If a deviation frOlTI the ordinary procedures is nlade, then
the pay can be set aside on this basis.
In Blythe v The Phoenix Foundary Ltd 173 it was held that directors could not pass a valid
resolution to increase their own remuneration unless they held all shares in the company.
This can be supported by what King II points out, that a director nlay not vote at a nleeting
at which his own relTIuneration is considered. Hahlo 174 makes reference to Trek Tyres Ltd v
Beukes 175 and Gundelfinger v African Textile Manufacturers Ltd176 in support of this view
and says that a director whose remuneration package is in issue need cast a vote at such
director's Ineeting. Obviously, in a large listed public company, it is not feasible that all
directors be owners of all the share capital in the company. This situation as espoused in
Blythe's case is envisaged in a private company or in a slnall public COlnpany, where all
directors Inight have vested interests in the fonll of shares in the COlTIpany.
A typical exanlple of a case where the couti nlade an intervention where pay was not at all
aligned to perfonnance is Roger v Hill.. 177 The couli was of the view that it could justly
provide a relTIedy against a conlpany if paYll1ent made to executives constituted a waste.
172 PL Davies (note 130 above), 613
173 1922 WLD 87
174 Hahlo South African Company Law through cases 5rh ed (1991) Juta, 219
175 1957 (3) SA 306
176 1939 AD 314
177 (1933) 289 US 582
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The court indicated that the compensation paid to directors should not be so large as in
substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste of corporate property.l78
2.3.2 COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION
Breaches of fiduciary duties enable shareholders or the cOlnpany to sue the wrongdoers in
terms of conlnl0n law derivative action or in tel1llS of statutory derivative action provided
for by section 266 of the COlnpanies Act 61 of 1973. These actions can be used to
challenge director's decisions about executive pay"
2.3.2.1 COMMON LAW DERIVATIVE ACTION
Executive relnuneration can further be challenged under the con1n10n law derivative action
on the basis that pay has been detennined in a n1anner that constitutes a breach of the duties
of loyalty and good faith owed to a COlllpany by its directors. It is arguable that pay that is
not linked to perfolmance is tantmnount to breach of fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the con1pany. As earlier pointed out, the directors' fiduciary duties are owed to
the company as a whole. Awarding excessive pay constitutes nlala fide conduct on their
part and goes against their duties of good faith, conflicts of interest and duty against
making secret profits. Shareholders can be able to prove unratifiable wrong comnlitted
against the conlpany by virtue of pay not being linked to perfolmance. In this regard, the
llIle in Foss v Harbottle179 detennines that the Inajority has the right to bar an action by the
minority whenever they Inay lawfully ratify alleged Inisconduct, and secondly, that it is
normally the exclusive right of the company to sue upon a corporate right of actiol1. 180
178 Ibid, 591
179 (1843) 2 Hare 461
180 The rule was defined clearly in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and Others (1982)
ALL ER 254 in the following terms: 1. The proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be
done to a corporation is prima facie the corporation. 2. Where the alleged wrong is a h'ansaction which might
be made binding on the corporation and on all its members by a simple majority of the members, no
individual member of the corporation is allowed to maintain an action in respect of the matter because, if the
majority confirms the transaction, cadit quaestio: or, if the majority challenges the h-ansactions, there is no
reason why the company should not sue. 3. There is also no room for the operation of the rule if the alleged
wrong is ultTa vires the corporation because the majority of members cannot confirm the h"ansaction. 4. There
is also no room for the operation of the rule if the h'ansaction complained of could be validly done or
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Minority shareholders n1ay institute a derivative action on behalf of the company against
the wrongdoers who are guilty of a breach of their fiduciary duties to the con1pany, if the
wrongdoers are able to prevent the company from suing theIn in its own nmne because they
control a lnajority of the votes at a general meeting, or because they are otherwise able to
prevent a general meeting from resolving that the con1pany shall sue them.
181
Williams
indicates that the alleged fraud involves an abuse of power, and not fraud in the narrow
sense of the word. 182 The abuse of power consists of an unfair discrin1ination of a nature
that benefits the Inajority at the expense of the tninority. It can also be translated as
constituting a transfer of advantages from the Ininority to the lnajority and finally, consists
of a scenario where the Inajority precludes the con1pany from instituting legal action to
recoup assets that properly belong to it.
A derivative action may therefore be brought when a corporate opportunity has been
usurped. A derivative action will only sustain where it can be established that there was
fraud on the lninority. It further has to be proved that the wrongdoers' are in control of the
company and as a result, can easily prevent the company froln bringing an action against
then1selves. 183 In Cook v Deeks/84 a derivative action succeeded and the defendants, being
majority shareholders, were ordered to account to the cOlnpany for all the profits that they
had made out of a new contract that they had secured for then1selves in due disregard of the
interests of the COlnpany as a whole. The wrongdoers had appropriated for thelnselves a
business opportunity which the con1pany would otherwise have enjoyed. The effect of the
decision in this case is that although the shareholders may vote as they please, the n1ajority
cannot appropriate the cOlnpany's assets to then1selves at the expense of the Ininority.185 In
the same breath, excessive directors' relnuneration can be challenged if those who decide
sanctioned only by a special resolution or the like, because a simple majority calmot confirm a transaction
which requires the conCUlTence of a greater majority. 5. There is an exception to this rule where what has
been done amounts to fraud and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company. In this case the
rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority, who are allowed to bring a minority shareholders' action
on behalf of themselves and all others. The reason for this is that, if they were denied that right, their
grievance would never reach the court because the wrongdoers themselves, being in control, would not allow
the company to sue.
18t Gower Principles ofModern Company Law, 647
182 RC Williams (note above), 241
183 Pavlides v Jensen (1956) 1 Ch 565,575; Mongalo, 268
184 191 G(1) AC 554
185 McLelman J 'Company Directors - Fiduciwy duties' (1989) 1 SA Merc LJ 123, 128
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on such pay fail to comply with their duties of loyalty and good faith that are owed to the
company as a whole. In Zel1'lCO v Jerrom-Pugh 186 reliance was made on these duties to try
and set aside ren1uneration payments n1ade. It was intilnated by the Greenbury comn1ittee
that it was incolnpatible with the duty to act in the best interests of the company for
directors to agree to pay 'over the odds'. 187 In Roger v Hill,188 the court struck down
director's ren1uneration packages on the basis that the an10unts constituted a spoliation or
waste of corporate propeliy. The couli had this to say
.. .If a bonus payn1ent has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it
is in reality a gift in part and the Inajority of stockholders have no power to give
. h f . . 189away corporate property agaInst t e protest 0 mInonty.
Pay that is not linked to performance has to be regarded as an unratifiable wrong
cOlnn1itted against the company on the basis that it constitutes a fraud upon the n1inority. In
this case, because the board, as the alter ego, is in control as the mind of the cOlnpany, set
their own relTIuneration packages, and would not allow the company to sue in the event of
aggrieved melnbers wishing to institute action against them; their acts should be deemed as
unratifiable on this basis. They cannot appropriate the cOlnpany's assets to their own
benefit to the detriment of the n1inority shareholders. More so, where the packages received
are unjustified when contrasted with individual perfOlTI1anCeS of management as such,
constitute a waste of company assets. Obviously, excessive arnounts that are not aligned to
performance directly have an ilnpact on the shareholder's equity, as it would be
substantially reduced. It is fraud of shareholder lnonies, which is tantarnount to awarding
gifts of which the minority shareholders have no power or say over. These awards cam10t
therefore be ratified by a resolution of members at a 111eeting.
What one has to establish at this juncture, is whether it can be said that in a publicly quoted
con1pany, where directors in control are wrongdoers, but really do not have voting control





for theln to be regarded as being in control, they are really in control as they do not
constitute the nlajority. In South Africa, Mongalo indicates that often, in listed companies,
all shareholders are minority shareholders in that no shareholder holds lnore than even 25
per cent of the shares. 190 In most instances, directors own tiny fractions of shares in a
publicly quoted conlpany they engage their services in and therefore do not constitute the
majority. Hence why it would not be easy for one to conclude that they are the wrongdoers
in control. For this reason, it lnight be very difficult for the minority shareholders to
establish breach of fiduciary duties on the basis that the wrongdoers in control have
breached their fiduciary duties owed to the conlpany as a whole.
As Mongalo points out, it is unlikely that shareholders who wish to assert their rights in
listed companies would resort to COlnmon law derivative litigation to discipline
lnanagement due to the fact that wrongdoer control is a great obstacle in listed companies
to derivative litigation. 191 He goes on to say that it would be difficult to prove wrongdoer
control because executives and non-executive directors rarely own large stakes in publicly
quoted cOlnpanies; as such, as potential wrongdoers with regard to a breach of duty, it
would be impossible to establish wrongdoer control. As such, even if there is a wrong to
the company that calIDot be ratified, wrongdoer control is a major obstacle in publicly
quoted companies in South Africa. It is sublnitted that in the light of the setting of
renluneration packages for directors, wrongdoer control should be viewed from a different
perspective; the courts should decide it on the basis of holding office as a director, and not
the stake that directors have in the COll1pany. This is so because effectively, as the alter
egos of the company engaged in lnaking key nlanagerial decisions, they are in 'control' and
have to be held accountable for all decisions that ilnpact negatively on the company's
equity.
In as much it is acknowledged that the wrongs cannot be ratified where fraud or abuse of
power is alleged, or where the directors exercise their powers Inala fide or for an inlproper
190 T Mongalo 'Corporate governance reforms and directors' remuneration, a critical comparative analysis:
Part '], 3
191 T Mongalo ' Two steps forward, one step back: directors duty to act for the benefit of the company
revisited in the aftemlath of corporate governance reforms', 17 (Unpublished article)
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purpose, it is further subnlitted however, that it would be very difficult for shareholders to
prove breach of tnlst on the basis of disloyalty and nlala fides sinlply because excessive
remuneration packages have been awarded. In addition, it is doubtful whether this would
be the way to go as conlpanies never really initiate any proceedings in couli against boards
of directors who have approved and granted unwananted compensations.
Then again, as McLemlanl92 puts it, there are a nunlber of problelns associated with this
form of derivative action. While there is no guarantee that the applicant shareholder(s) Inay
succeed, the costs associated with moving such application can be immense. This in its
own way deters individual parties fronl instituting any proceedings against the wrongdoers.
The wrongdoers Inay also make it difficult for lninority shareholders to secure or access
relevant infonllation pertaining to the action as such infoIll1ation is in their (wrongdoers ')
custody. 193 Even though King II advocates for transparency and disclosure of remuneration
packages, the wrongdoers in control can still hide SOlne critical information that ITIight
assist the applicants in their action. Moreover, as fraud is very difficult to prove, it can be
very difficult for the applicant in evidence to prove fraud or negligence on the part of the
board of directors on the basis of having awarded excessive renluneration packages. Based
on these facts, the conlmon law derivative action may not avail us a solution to the problem
of curbing excessive pay. The problenls and difficulties associated with the COmITIOn law
derivative action led to the introduction of the statutory derivative action in South Africa.
2.3.2.2 STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION
In tenns of section 266 of the Companies Act, individual shareholders can Inove an
application to the couli for the appointlnent of a provisional curator ad litenl, who then
investigates the inegularities alleged to have been COlllil1itted by the wrongdoers in control
(board of directors). Individual shareholders do not get involved in the suit directly, and the
curator will then report back to the court. Based on the report subnlitted, the court in




exercising its discretion will then decide whether or not to appoint a final curator ad litem,
who will then institute proceedings against the wrongdoers. The section reads as follows
Any nlelnber of the company may initiate proceedings on behalf of the company
against any director or officer, (past or present) notwithstanding that the company has
ratified the wrong conlplained of, in circull1stances where -
a) a company has suffered dmnages or loss or has been deprived of any benefit as a
result of a wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith that has been committed,
b) the wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith has been cOlnmitted by any director
of that COlnpany or by any past director or officer while he was a director or
officer of that conlpany and
c) the COlnpany has not instituted proceedings to redress the wrong.
2.3.2.3 DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH JUDICIAL REGULATION
OF EXECUTIVE PAY
Individual shareholders can challenge an executive pay award on the basis of breach of
duty or trust. However, this section is problelnatic in a number of respects. For one, the
right to sue is regarded that of the conlpany; 194 as such, the conlpany is deemed the rightful
plaintiff and it will be difficult for the shareholders to prove that they are entitled to bring
proceedings on behalf of the cOlnpany. In addition, in the event of the Inelnbers succeeding
against the wrongdoers, any benefit that could accrue to a plaintiff shareholder is only if the
success of the trial would lead to substantial increases in the cOlnpany share value. 195
Often, members do not bother to nlake these applications because they stand to gain on an
equal basis should any other member successfully sue l96 ; and then again, they are not
guaranteed to win as this lies solely in the discretion of the court. Mongalo 197 notes that the
other detening factor is the fact that shareholders generally own shares or portfolios in
dozens of listed companies, hence why menlbers never really feel the need to pursue a
194 Mongalo, 276
195 Ibid
196 Ibid, See also Cheffins (1997) who makes reference to free riding tactics, 257
197 Ibid, 277
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derivative action. In South Africa, however, very few cases have been reported to date on
members utilizing this section to try and discipline Inanagenlent,198 In any event, the
success of the statutory derivative action will largely depend on the court's willingness to
intervene in decisions of the board, which as already espoused, is unlikely, based on the
business judgement rule.
The above signifies that courts of law have tried to lay down and protect the interests of
shareholders of the conlpany, against devious motives of sonle of the directors. However,
practice has shown over the years that cOUlis of law are unlikely to find a breach of duty in
respect of executive relnuneration. In America, for instance, it can only be found if
payments are found to constitute waste. Other than Roger v HiU199, no other successful suit
has been brought against a large quoted cOlnpany in the US. The same reluctance can be
seen in the recent case of Re WaIt Disney Company Derivative Litigation2oo. In this case, a
shareholder sought to challenge a $140 million severance package to a departing senior
executive. The court dismissed the action on the basis that the court would not second
guess the decisions of the Board except in rare cases where a transaction Inay be so
outrageous on its face that the Board could not have been exercising proper business
judgment. It went on to say that except in rare cases, where a transaction was so outrageous
on its face that the board could not have been exercising proper business judglnent, the
court would intervene. It indicated that where fraud is not alleged, a judge should respect
decisions of directors particularly in matters of executive conlpensation. It recognized that
while directors have a duty of care towards the conlpany, they cmIDot be held liable for
errors of judglnent in certain instances. For these reasons, the court could not overrule the
severance package just on the basis of the size of the award. In Australia, section 243K of
the Companies Act makes provision for approval of executive packages by shareholders -
they are to be approved unless the package is exelnpted on the basis that it is reasonable. 2ol
198 Even though the Companies Act was inh'odueed in 1973, very few cases have been reported on the
utilization of this section.
199 Supra
200 (1998) 731 A.2d 242
201 Havenga M 'The businessjudgment rule: should we/oUmv the Australian example?' 2000 (12) SA Mere
LJ 25. See also BR Cheffins, 674
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However, it is subn1itted that South Africa cmIDot adopt this reasonableness test, as it is too
vague.
2.3.2.3 PREJUDICIAL OR OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
Executive remuneration can further be challenged under section 252 on the basis that it is
oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the shareholders and the cOlnpany.
The section reads that
Any Inember who complains that any particular act or on1ission of a COlnpany is
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable or that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or
some part of the members, may apply to court for an order in terms of subsection
(3)' .
Subsection (3) stipulates that the court has wide powers 'to bring to an end the Inatters
complained of. Misappropriation of corporate assets clearly falls within the mnbit of the
section. It is submitted that exorbitant renluneration packages constitute a 111isappropriation
of company funds and is prejudicial to the interests of the company as a whole. 202 This
section gives shareholders the right to apply to a court for relief where it appears that the
relnuneration paid to a director is so excessive as to result in prejudice to the COlnpany.
With this provision, Ininority shareholders can sue without being concerned about the
procedural constraints in1posed by the rule in Foss v Harbottle. Willimns indicates that in
the detelmination of whether such conduct was unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to
the shareholders, the motive behind the conduct 111ay be relevant, but of lTIOst concenl is the
result and effect that the conduct and will have on the nlenlbers. 203
202 In terms of section 459 of the UK Companies Act 1985, excessive remuneration can be regarded as
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of shareholders.
203 RC Williams (note above), 245
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Breaches of directors' fiduciary duties lnay establish unfair prejudice to n1inority
shareholders, at least in a private company and in a slnall public company.204 However, for
public cOlnpanies, this section would not preclude such exorbitant packages being awarded.
This is purely because invariably, judges Inake reliance on the business managelnent rule
and are usually reluctant and refrain from making business decisions, or as it is usually put,
from second guessing the decisions of company directors. As McLelU1an puts it, the major
difficulty is the law's reluctance to place the courts in a position where they are to be the
arbiters of the wisdOln of con1mercial decisions.205 In Levin v Felt and Tweeds Ltd,206 the
Appellate Division indicated that 'It is no part of the business of a court of justice to
detennine the wisdon1 of a course adopted by a company in the n1anagen1ent of its own
affairs'. Centlivres Cl put the Inatter this way
Counsel for the appellant correctly adInitted that the court is not concerned with the
comlnercial wisdon1 of the schelne, yet in order to prove that it was not bona fide he
endeavored to show that there were other and better ways of raising additional
working capital. . .In the absence of any allegation that the directors acted Inala fide
this an10unts to asking this couli to usurp the functions of the directors and to
consider what is the best for the cOlnpany from the business point of view. This is
not the function of the court of law. 207
In the United States, the same objective standard for directors' competence applies and is
well established.
208
It appears that this rule operates to relieve the directors of liability in
most instances, if not all. For these reasons, aggrieved shareholders who initiate
proceedings against the cOlnpany directors hardly ever succeed in the courts of law. The
restrictions that affect and regulate executive relnuneration packages in listed con1panies do
not seem to curb and deter excessive awards of remuneration packages. It seen1S therefore
that based on this principle, aggrieved Inelubers are unlikely to succeed in courts of law on
their clailns against boards that a\vard thelnselves handsOlne or generous packages.
204 Havenga MK, 83
205 McLennan J 'Misapplication ofcompany funds - a proposal for reform) (1993) 644, 650
206 1951 (2) SA 401
207 Ibid, 414
208 PL Davies (note 130 above), 600
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It is subn1itted that much reliance CalUl0t be placed on the judiciary intervening in lnatters
pertaining to executive ren1uneration, as in the few decisions cited above; courts appear to
be very reluctant to take decisions on excessive pay packages. The question that remains is
whether any reliance can be n1ade on boards of directors to try and resolve these issues.
One lnay assume that boards are best suited to assist in curbing excessive remuneration
packages. However, in South Africa, it appears that in practice, one out of two directors
will be executive directors. 209 As such, when salaries are detennined, it cam10t be expected
that objectivity and reasonableness will be exercised. They will be biased and will want to
get the best out of the cOlnpany. For this reason, the boards do not seeln to be the best
option to resolve the issue of excessive executive remuneration. This is one reason why
modem corporate democracy nl0ves for independent remuneration boards, which are to
consist of independent executive directors who have no attaclu11ent or contractual links
with the COlnpany. It is believed that they will con1e up with reasonable judgments. It is
however unclear how this would curb generous packages given the nature of system
adopted in this jurisdiction. The Greenbury Comlnittee at para 1.12 takes note of the
potential conflict of interests with respect to executive pay and it advocates for
independence of directors who sit in relnuneration cOlnn1ittees. Para 4.12 of the Hampel
Repoli rubber stanlps this recon1mendation but it notes that even though a renluneration
comn1ittee sits on and decides executive pay packages, the lnenlbers are still part of the
board and whatever decisions they reach are regarded as the boards decisions. These
recommendations, as shall be discussed hereunder, have their own liInitations and failures.
It is clear froln the above that our coulis are not really enthusiastic to regulate managerial
relnuneration in public cOlnpanies. The courts seem to have left it in the boards and
shareholders discretion to deternline what reasonable relnuneration packages to afford
directors. Because of the attitude that they take, it is clear that one would not recolnlnend
that courts be adjudicators of executive pay.
209T Mongalo 'Corporate Governance reforms and directors' remuneration, a critical comparative analysis:
Part 2' (Unpublished article), 5
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENTS THAT LED TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
As a result of massive corporate failures and scandals, various legal systems recognized the
need for control of company management. While it was seen that regulating executive
relTIuneration in companies by making reliance on comn10n law principles was failing in a
lot of respects, it was felt that other methods of achieving this control be resorted to, so as
to try and fonnally regulate company n1anagelnent. 2IO In view of the law explored in the
previous chapter, both English and South African panels on corporate govelllance
recommended that corporate governance be regulated by means of Codes of Conduct.
Consistent with this reasoning, the UK's Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Comlnittees
sought to influence n1anagerial behavior by issuing guidelines designed to iInprove links
between executive pay and corporate perfoffi1ance. The origin and rationale behind each of
the COlTI111ittees that Calne up with these proposals shall be discussed hereunder. The
character and content of the recommendations or provisions of the Codes as applicable to
executive remuneration in South Africa shall be explored in the next chapter.
3.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM
3.1.2 THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE COMMITTEES
As already espoused in the previous chapter, the functions and responsibilities of corporate
directors arise by virtue of the juristic nature of a COlnpany. Since it CalU10t act on its own
behalf, cOlnpany acts are conducted through representatives, one of which is the board of
directors; who are entrusted with managelnent of the con1pany's business.211 COlnpany
Inanagement can only be effective if those who n1anage it are granted son1e certain Ineasure
of freedom and discretion in the exercise of their function. On the other hand effective,
210 The other method of achieving this control is by means of a supervisory board as found in German. See
Chapter 7
211 Havenga MK 'Fiducimy duties ofcompany directors with specific regard to cOlporate opportunities', 1
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control of luanagement is vital in the interests of the conlpany itself, its shareholders and its
creditors. This basic philosophy was reiterated by the Cadbury Comluittee in England:
No systenl of corporate govelnance can be totally proof against fraud or
incompetence. The test is how far such abenations can be discouraged and how
quickly they can be brought to light. The risks can be reduced by making the
participants in the govelnance process as effectively accountable as possible.
212
For this reason, cOlnpany directors are subjected to various duties as categorized in the
previous chapter, and effective control is largely dependent upon the efficient enforcelnent
of these duties.
The main discussions in this chapter are based on the committees comnlissioned following
traditional corporate govenlance failures and SOlne of the instrulnents relied on for good
corporate governance. The main events, which provoked the process, in the late 1980s and
early '90s, were the accounting systelns failures, which characterized the collapse of Polly
Peck plc and the Bank of Credit and Comlnerce Intenlational, and the comprehensive
govenlance failures, which led to the Maxwell scanda1. 213 It involved the substantial
collapse of the Daily Minor newspaper and the plundering of the Minor employees'
pension fund by a dominant chainnan and chief executive officer who was unchecked by
his cOlnpliant and supine board of directors and a body of investors, (including SOlTIe Inajor
financial institutions) who had earlier been wanled that Maxwell 'could not be relied on to
exercise proper stewardship of a publicly quoted conlpany' by a report by govenunent
inspectors sonle twenty years before, but continued to support him.214 These events led not
only to concenlS over the reputation of the London lnarkets but also to a widespread public
and political concenl.
212 Report ofthe Committee on the Financial Aspects ofCOl porate Governance (1992) par 7.2
213 Rickford J ' Do good governance recommendations change the rules for the board ofdirectors} Position
paper for the Siena Conference on company law and capital market law. 30 March 2000 http://www.econ-
pol.unisi. it/scdbanc/CONFERENZA/FILE PDF/8-Rickford. pdf
214 -
Maxwell v Departlnent ofTrade and Industry (1974) QB 523 CA
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However, even though earlier scandals produced a strong legislative reaction, by the 1990s,
the Thatcher and Major Governlnents had lost hope in con1pany legislation and the
inclination was towards governance through codes of practices, which it was felt would
cUliail bad business practices.2ls There still remains a strong bias in British company law
against legislative intervention in institutional and stnlctural aspects of company
goven1ance. For instance, the duties of individual board n1elnbers and the general
constraints on the proprietary powers of shareholders are a matter of case law.
216
A1nong the plethora of cases that culminated into corporate scandals in the UK, Guinness
plc v Saunder/17 as previously discussed, exposed some of the shortcolnings of the old
traditional corporate board systen1s, awards of exorbitant ren1uneration packages and its
inadequate checks and balances. Another case that shows that traditional corporate
governance has its own failures is Pally Peck International plc v Asil Nadir and Others,218
wherein the chief executive director of a public COl11pany with over 200 subsidiaries was
signatory to all the branch accounts of the company and was in direct control of all its
funds. He allegedly Inisappropriated the cOlnpany's funds in the tune of over £378 Inillion
and left the cOlnpany in ruins. It is apparent that no proper checks and balances were
followed in these con1panies. It becan1e clear with the fall of Polly Peck International plc
that executive directors enjoyed dominance in boards in the UK and that there was a need
of placing proper checks and balances in cOlnpanies, particularly in instances where the
positions of chief executive director and the chainnan of the board are combined and non
executive directors are not as vigilant,219
As a result of the public outcry in the UI( over excessive remuneration packages, there was
a need for regulation or some investigation into these issues. In response, the UK Financial
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession
215 Ibid
21G LI I' . b 1 .
1. owever, t lIS IS a out to c lange as a result of the reCOl1U1lendatlOns by the Company Law Review
Steering Group in its Final Report, which reconunendations have been endorsed in the White Paper on
Modernizing Company law issued by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
217 Supra
218 (1992) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238
219 Mongalo, 194
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commissioned the establishn1ent of the Cadbury Repoli in May1992, together with its Code
of Best Practices to try and address the financial aspects of corporate goven1ance.
220
3.1.3 THE CADBURY REPORT
Its aim was to review those aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial
reporting and accountability. It can1e up with reCOlTIlnendations entitled 'the Report of the
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.' The Code of Best Practice
drawn by the committee was directed at the boards of directors of all listed companies in
the United I(ingdolu. It covered guidance on the board's role, including in particular the
need to ensure that the board is not dOluinated by one individual and is structured and
operated so as to maintain its independence;221 it recolun1ended that listed companies
conlply with its Code or include a stateluent in their annual reports justifying their non-
conlpliance.222 It elTIphasized the need and ilnpoliance of independent non-executive
directors on the board including the qualities for each individual non-executive director,
required procedures for setting and disclosing directors' pay.223 It fmiher moved for the
establishment and implenlentation of board comnlittees like relTIuneration comluittees and
audit conlmittees. It dealt extensively with issues of controlling executive remuneration
packages, systelns of control to elnploy to avoid Inisuse of funds and nlaintenance of
effective intenlal controls and relationships with extelllaI auditors, how often directors
were to hold Ineetings and how boards should generally operate.
For the pronl0tion of good goven1ance, it advocated for a differentiation to be made
between the roles of the chainnan and that of the chief executive director. The report
confilmed that all directors are equally responsible in law for the board's actions and
220 It was headed by Sir Adrian Cadbury, and was named after him.
221 Cadbury did not however advise that the roles of chainnan and chief executive should be split
222 The London Stock Exchange adopted in its Listing Rules requirements (Section 12.43 now replaced) that
listed companies should report to shareholders in the annual report on their compliance with the code and that




decisions.224 Celiain directors 111ay have particular responsibilities, as executive or non-
executive directors, for which they are accountable to the board. It n1akes en1phasis on the
fact that regardless of the specific duties undeliaken by individual directors, it relnains the
task of the board collectively to ensure that it is n1eeting its obligations.
225
The committee
identifies two impoliant contributions by non-executive directors to the goven1ance
process. It Inoves for the reviewing of the perfolmance of the board and of the executive.
226
Secondly, taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise.
227
In view of the importance of independent judgnlent on issues of key appointlnents, the
COlmnittee recommends that all boards require a minimum of three non-executive
directors, one of wholn n1ay also be the chaitn1an of the company, provided he is not also
its executive head.228 The appointment should be for a specified tenn and reappointment
should not be auton1atic. 229 It further recommended that, apart from their directors' fees and
shareholdings; the Inajority of non-executives should be independent of the company. They
should therefore be independent of n1anagelnent and free fron1 any business or other
relationship, which could n1aterially interfere with the exercise of their independent
judgn1ent.23o At least three non-executive directors should fOlTI1 an audit committee with
written telms for reference, which deal clearly with its authority and duties. 23 ! As a rule,
executive directors attend and vote at lneetings of the board, but do not work full tin1e for
the conlpany and have no service contract, whereas non-executive directors have a service
contract under which they work full tilne for the cOlnpany.232
The Cadbury Committee thus envisages specific recognition of and a lnuch lnore important
role for non-executive directors. 233 The independence of these directors is enlphasized.
However, their duties are not discussed. In respect of n1embership of a remuneration
~~: Havenga MK, 'Fiduciary Duties ofdirectors with regard to corporate opportunities', S9
Cadbury Report 20, par 4.3
?26- Cadbury report 20-21, par 4.S
227 Cadbury report 21, par 4.6
228 Cadbury Report 22, par 4.11
229 Cadbury Report 59, par 2.3 of the code of Best Practice
230 Cadbury Report 22, par 4.12
231 Cadbury Report 27ff, 59
232 Hahlo 'South African Company Law through cases J 327
233 ' .
Cadbury report Chapter 4, par 2.2.1, and par 4.9 ofKmg I Report in South Africa
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con1mittee, it is recognized that this is not such a demanding task as would require training
and skill. It is submitted that in the light of recent public outcry of spiraling remuneration
packages of directors, even though their tasks, roles and functions of the non-executive
directors may differ, the duties they owe to the company are the smne. The distinction
between executive and non-executive directors is less ilnportant in respect of their fiduciary
duties in this regard.
Although the report deals with wider issues than executive pay setting, it makes
recolnmendations on reformation of boardroOlTI pay. It recommends that 'boards should
appoint relnuneration comn1ittees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors
and chaired by a non-executive director, to recolnn1end to the board the remuneration of the
executive directors in all its forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary. Executive
directors should play no part in decisions on their own ren1uneration' .234 Tricker points out
that these sentiments are echoed by many other shareholder and stakeholder bodies with an
interest in executive pay setting.235 He goes on to say that remuneration cOlnmittees should
act as independent arbiters of executive con1pensation on behalf of shareholders. Failure to
do so is tantamount to directors writing their own contracts with one hand and signing then1
with the other.236 This is one disadvantage of the Anglo-Saxon governance model adopted
not only in the UK, but also in many other jurisdictions including the USA and South
Africa. 237 Even though there really is no legal requirelnent that spells out the governance
structure and principles behind setting rellluneration packages, n10re cOlnpanies seen1 to be
cOlnplying with the Cadbury report as they are revealing the existence of rellluneration
con11nittees in their company reports and pay packages.238 This code was addressed to
listed companies but the hope was expressed that as many other con1panies as possible
would seek to meet its requirelnents. 239
234 Cadbury Report para 4.42, p31
235 Tricker, (Note above), 335
236 Ibid, 336
237 This shall be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters
238 Tricker, (Note above), 336
239 Cadbury Code 3.1 There seems to be an explicit abandonment of attempts to try and apply govemance




The second stage in the development of good governance recommendations in the UK was
the establislunent in 1995 of the Greenbury Conllnittee, which was under the chairn1anship
of Sir Richard Greenbury. It was formulated to try and deal exclusively with the issue of
directors' relnuneration.240 The concern which led to the establislllnent of this con1mittee
had less to do with governance and the operation of company boards and more with public
and govenllnent disquiet about the levels of remuneration being awarded to directors,
particularly to those in privatized utility cOlTIpanies?41 The Code issued by Greenbury
con1prehensively elaborated on the provisions of the Cadbury code about executive
director's relnuneration, including provision for an independent remuneration committee of
the board, whose composition would entirely be of independent non-executive directors,
who would review performance and set relTIuneration levels for executive directors, thus
ensuring that the responsibility for setting incentives and rewards is removed fronl the
board as a whole. It also dealt with establishnlent of an annual audited remuneration report,
in the name of the comlnittee setting out the full details in relation to each individual
director, and of all remuneration packages received and perquisites. 242 This con1n1ittee was
set up to try and deal with abuses relating to relTIuneration being paid to executive directors
of companies who were regarded as non-perfonners, and who were also granted share
options that were in no way aligned to perfonl1ance. 243 The recolTImendations made by the
Greenbury conl1nittee 1110ved for the prolTIotion and need for greater transparency, which is
echoed in K-ing II report,244 The main thrust of the Greenbury Code of Best Practice was
'Disclosure, transparency comparator relTIuneration and a robust approach to the
payment of cOll1pensation in relation to poorly performing directors'. 245
240 S dmer on, (Note above), 66
241 Rickford, (Note above), 8
242 Ibid, 9
243
Smerdol1 (Note above), 66
244 K" 11mg ,para 2.5.10
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It is believed that greater disclosure of directors' pay packages would lead to a better
understanding of directors' reITIuneration and possibly lead to a curtailn1ent of excessive
reITIuneration. The UK listing rules make it n1andatory for listed con1panies to include a
remuneration report to shareholders in the atillual report and accounts that have details of
ren1uneration of directors. 246 It n1ade emphasis on the need for the establishlTIent of
independent ren1uneration COITIInittees in boards of directors.
A further concen1 was with cOInpensation packages on dismissal. In tenns of section 319 of
the UK Con1panies Act,247 a maximum notice period is set and the level of compensation
for loss of office without a specific general Ineeting resolution endorselnent is 5 years.
Greenbury, supported by Hampel Con1111ittee, proposed a reduced 'nolmal' period of one
year. 248 The British Law Comn1ission in their report on directors' duties and conflicts of
interest proposed a reduction to three years.
3.1.5 HAMPEL COMMITTEE
The third stage in the developnlent of good corporate governance codes in the DK. was
elnbodied in the work of a cOlnmittee called the Hampel COInmittee, which was chaired by
Sir Ronald Hampel. It was established in 1995 at the recomlnendation of the Cadbury
COll11nittee, to review the recommendations Inade by both the Cadbury Con1mittee and
Greenbury Comlnittees and their operation. It reported on the implelnentation of the
reCOITIlnendations made by the other cOlnmittees and proposed an1endInents, and 1110re
significantly, it extended the enquiry further by looking 'afresh' into the role in governance
of shareholders and auditors. 249
A nun1ber of concerns were raised in this report. In relation to executive remuneration,
while Greenbury advocated for increased transparency, it noted that this had little or indeed
no effect in checking the rate of its increase. The wage gap is still spiraling out of control
246 Ibid, 66
247 The UK Companies Act of 1985
248 bGreen my Report Chapter 7 and Hampel Report 24
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and this exceeded by a wide n1argin the rate of wage inflation in the eCOnOlTIY as a whole. It
is still believed in some quarters that the effect of Greenbury had actually increased the
'going rate', at least in the less generous cOlnpanies.250 Others believe that one reason for
the lack of restraint was that the levels of ren1uneration of executives are sky high, and as
such were not well placed to can)! the burden of asserting their control rights as
institutional shareholders to restrain the level of director's remuneration.
Another concern raised by this C01111nittee related to the growing cost of cOlnpliance with
the corporate governance codes. It was argued out by some that the proliferation of board
con1mittee meetings to monitor and police board operations was distracting boards from
their Inain operational purpose, which in the British unitaI)! board culture is to lead the high
level strategy and monitor the operation of the business and that the emphasis on disclosure
was leading to perfunctory box ticking and a preoccupation with process, rather than a
focus on operational perfonnance. 251 On reviewing the Cadbul)! and Greenbury
c0111mittees' recolnmendations, HaInpel reasserts the collective responsibility of the board;
for instance, the repmi on relnuneration should not in Hampel' s view have been in the
naIne of the relnuneration conlnlittee, but of the board as a whole.
Hampel moved for the restructuring of the existing codes in a new form. It moved for a
distinction to be made and reflected in the fon11 of statelnents of general principles by
reference to which boards were to declare their implementing philosophy, with
in1plen1enting provisions being Inerely guidelines that develop the principles that will also
reflect on earlier codes.
252
This distinction is reflected in the distinctions in the
in1plen1enting COlnbined Code between 'principles' and 'provisions'. 253
Most of the recolnnlendations Inade by these panels were implemented by the London
Stock Exchange and were encompassed in its Listing Rules, which were known as the
Yellow Book; this was in a fom1 of an appendix, known as the COlnbined Code which was
250 Ibid
251 Ibid, 10
252 L: 1.dampe Report, Chapter 2
253 The principles remain as principles but the explanatory guidance has become 'provisions' - See London
Stock Exchange Listing Rule 12.43A and Combined code 'appended to' the Rules, (Combined Code)
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included in the rules and this constituted a guide to corporate governance for listed
companies on the Stock Exchange in London,254 The Han1pel Comlnittee recolnlnended
that the remuneration report to shareholders in the annual report and accounts is to be by
the board as a whole and not by the reInuneration committee only, as was previously
. db h 1" 1 255envIsage y t e Istlng ru es.
3.1.6 SOUTH AFRICA: KING REPORTS
THE RATIONALE BEHIND KING'S REPORTS
Previously, in South Africa, there were no financial journalists who could detelmine
Inisdemeanors of executive directors' wrongdoings. As in the UK and the USA, over time,
South African cOInpanies such as First Rand, De Beers Old Mutual and others that are
listed on the London Stock exchange (LSE) were required to comply with the LSE listing
requirements and therefore to adopt sound corporate goven1ance standards.256 Kakabadse
indicates that 'similar to the experiences of the stewardship of con1panies in the USA and
the UK, the King Committee's initiatives on corporate governance in South Africa are, in
pati, a response to the corporate scandals that arose as a result of poor corporate
governance practices in South African corporations' .257 The collapse of Masterbond in the
early 1990's, in which n1i11ions of rands in shareholders' and policyholders' wealth were
lost, has been high in the media spotlight.258 More recently, with less disastrous results but
equally discrediting, was the investors' adlTIonishment of the Nedcor's board for self-
enrichment, in the fonn of share incentive schelne, which awarded a nUlnber of directors
for the performance of external companies in which it had invested. 259
254 Mongalo, 195
255 Smerdon (Note above), 67
256 Kakabadse(Note above), 305
257 Ibid
258 Ibid
259 Mongalo (Note above),
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3.1.7 THE KING I AND 11 REPORTS
Along the UK model of refoml, South Africa recently endeavoured to investigate a Code of
Conduct for C01npany directors. The report by the King Com1nittee on corporate
govenlance, under the chainnanship of Mervyn E ICing, was first published in Nove1nber
1994. When it came into place, it had to consider aspects encompassing recent
developments in South Africa; it had to consider the impact of the new Constitution of
South Africa, Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act. More especially, it
had to consider issues relating to affil1l1ative action and black econonlic empowemlent
issues, which are characteristic and peculiar to South Africa alone.
The King C01nnlittee sinlultaneously published together with its report, the Code of
Corporate Practices and Conduct, which has been nlade pati and parcel of the
Johalulesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirenlents in Schedule 22. This rep01i
was reviewed and a comprehensive one, known as King II, was published and became
operative from March 2002. All the recolnnlendations nlade are directed at all companies
listed on the Inain board of the JSE, large public entities as defined in the Reporting by
Public Entities Act 93 of 1992, banks, financial and insurance entities as defined in the
various Financial Services Acts, large unlisted dependent companies, large quasi-state
entities such as control boards and cooperatives?60 The recolnlnendations in King II are
ailned at affected cOlnpanies. 261
The repoli constitutes a blueprint for corporate govenlance in South Africa in the foml of
the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. 262 This code is important as it f01111S the
260 H (avenga, Note above), 403
261 The Code ofCorporate Practices and Conduct (2002) para 1.1 defines affected companies as 'all
companies with securities listed on the JSE; banks, financial and insurance entities as designed in the various
legislation regulating South African financial services sector; public sector enterprises and agencies that fall
under the Management Bill including any department of state, or administTation in the national, provincial or
local sphere of government or any other functionary or institution (i) exercising a power or performing a
function in terms of the Constitution; or (ii) exercising public power or performing public function in telms of
any legislation, but not including a Court or a judicial officer. '
262 1Monga 0, (Note above), 199
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basis of the recolnmendations n1ade, which affected con1panies are to follow. However,
these recon1n1endations are not Inandatory; listed con1panies will not be forced to cOlnply
with the listing requirements, but where there is no cOlnpliance and there are no reasons
given for non-colnpliance, the con1pany may be subjected to heavy penalties. The
philosophy behind all corporate goven1ance codes is 'cOlllply or explain'. COlllpanies are
advised to comply with the Code as this would be indicative of company's good
goven1ance and shareholders will hence invest therein. In the context of corporate
govelllance, a proper balance needs to be achieved between freedom to manage,
accountability and the interests of the different stakeholders.
263
Whereas the Cadbury
recolnmendations involved the financial aspects of corporate goven1ance and focused on
integrity and shareholder dOlninance, the King cOlnlnittee was of the opinion that the
en1phasis should be on a participative entrepreneurial approach rather than a dOlninant
one.264
Even though King II deals holistically with good goven1ance,265 it does not deal
comprehensively with the issue of executive remuneration. It contains specific guidelines
that relate to, aInong other things, directors' ren1lll1eration. The JSE has encompassed this
in its Code and all listed cOlllpanies in the JSE have to con1ply, failing which, reasons have
to be availed why they cannot COlllply.
With its recon1mended Code of Conduct, the K.ing Con1n1ittee recognized the need for
independent supervision of larger cOlllpanies. All con1panies are encouraged to adopt the
Code. It is believed that self-regulation is the optin1un1 way of improving corporate
governance. The Code of Conduct is designed to achieve the necessary high standards of
corporate behavior. King II suggests that its enforceability and achievement n1ust be made
via the support of prOlninent associations, which should bind their n1elnbers to con1ply with
263 King II
264 Havenga MK, 404
265 It investigated financial reporting and accountability, good practices concerning the responsibilities of
executive and non executive directors, the case for audit committees, the principle responsibility of auditors
and the links between shareholders, boards and auditors. It also came up with a Code of ethical practice for
business enterprises in South Africa, with due consideration of the special circumstances prevailing in South
Africa, more particularly the emergence of a new class of entrepreneur being members of the disadvantaged
conmmnities.
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the Code, by incorporating the principles In the listing requirements for maIn board
cOlnpanies on the JSE and by peer pressure.
It is noted however, that delisting rarely happens as a sanction. The probleln is that even if
it were, delisting of cOlnpanies for non-disclosure may have the detrilnental effect that
investors will find it n10re difficult to get rid of their shares in the offending COlnpany by
selling them. To try and promote disclosure of remuneration packages in annual financial
statelnents, it is submitted that the SaIne policy of shunning non-compliant companies
adopted in England by institutional investors be adopted. 266 These sanctions if imposed to
all offending companies will be sufficient in South Africa to cUliail poor Inanagelnent
practices. It is noted however, that a single code of Conduct may not easily provide for the
needs of all South African con1panies in view of the fact that they are of different sizes,
nature and objects.
3.1.7 CODE OF CORPORATE PRACTICE
For the Code to be effective, n1echanislns have to be developed to try and enforce it. In
ten11S of Section 6 of King II, the Code can be enforced primarily by means of law and by
self-regulation. In so far as law is concerned, Inost of the provisions in the Code are a
duplication of what is already in existence in our cOlnpany law. Section 1 covers fiduciary
duties, duties of skill and care and others, which duties are peliinent in the Con1pany's Act
and at COlTIlTIOn law. These will be enforced in the ordinary cause of events, as directors can
be held liable for any wrongdoings by the courts. However, as discussed in the previous
chapter, law enfOrCelTIent has its own failures. For this reason, self-regulation was seen as a
better means of trying to regulate cOlnpanies. Self-regulation is a role that is largely played
by the JSE through its Schedule 22. It restates what is in the Code of Conduct. All
companies listed unde!'" the JSE have to cOlnply with listing requiren1ents. The stock
exchange listed cOlnpanies are required to provide full disclosure regarding directors'
266 Havenga MK, 406
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salaries. 267 The principles and recomn1endatiol1s made In the light of executive
ren1uneration in the code shall be discussed hereunder. I(ing II, Chapter 8 relates
specifically with issues peliaining to executive pay. The principles and recommendations
that fonn the basis of this branch of corporate governance shall be discussed in the
subsequent chapter.
267 In the Netherlands, there is legislation that is at an advanced stage, which will give shareholders more say
in the matter of remuneration for the board of directors. However, salaries, bonuses and golden handshakes




RECOMMENDATIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN SOUTH
AFRICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
With the advent of corporate governance refonns both in South Africa and Britain, a
specific duty to take account of stakeholder interests was seen as itnpractical and rather,
disclosure was seen as an effective mechanisn1 for catering for stakeholder interests?68
Essentially, the main objective in the recolnnlendations pertaining to executive
remuneration was the need for greater transparency, which is echoed in King n. It is felt
that greater transparency will lead to a better asseSSlnent and understanding of awards nlade
to directors, and possibly lead to the curtaihnent of exorbitant packages.
The Combined Code takes cognizance of the fact that there is no aliglunent between pay
and perfonllance. Section 2.5.5 states that
The perfonnance related elelnents of relnuneration should form a significant
proportion of the total remuneration package of executive directors and should be
designed to align their interests with those of shareholders and to give theln keen
incentives to perform.269
The underlying principle is that directors should be paid well when the conlpany is
thriving, and be penalized when the cOl1lpany is perfolming badly. This is hardly ever the
case as invariably, they tend to receive good lucrative payments when the conlpany is
perfoflning well and never really suffer the consequences by being penalized should
performance fall below expectations. It is fluiher felt that disclosure of the packages will
lead to the curtaihnent of excessive packages.no
268 T Mongalo 'Two steps forward:', 13
269 See also Schedule 22 para 22.7.5
270 Para 2.5.4
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It is felt that effective disclosure will highlight such pay that is not linked to performance
and it is believed that directors would be too embanassed to grant or receive such pay if
and when they are aware that shareholders and other stakeholders are likely to criticize
such packages. Elements of reJnuneration packages that often are criticized as not being
aligned in any fmm to perfomlance are share options and golden handshakes. Greenbury
Conlmittee makes note of the concerns over severance packages and King II goes a step
further and requires full disclosure in respect of severance packages, where as it says
'abuse can take place'. The other concern leveled by the Greenbury conlnlittee is the
granting of share options as a fonn of reward to executive directors. These are often
exercised by directors when the company is perfolming well and refrain to use then when
the conlpany perfonnance is poor.
King II states that cOlnpanies should provide full disclosure of directors' remuneration on
an individual basis giving details of earnings, share options and all other benefits.271 This
recommendation has no\v been included in the JSE Listing Requirements and as such, all
publicly quoted cOlnpanies will be forced to con1ply.272 King II indicates that 'regulation by
adoption of the philosophy of disclosure has a nunlber of beneficial effects'. 273 It states that
disclosure has a shrinking effect. 274 It is believed that greater transparency will be achieved
if directors ren1uneration is fully disclosed, thus shrink excessive packages that are without
proper justification.275 King II reiterates what Greenbury advocates for. It goes further and
suggests that disclosure on an individual basis should be nlade.
The effect of disclosing on an individual basis is that it would be easier for shareholders to
vote in favor or against the remuneration packages of each director based on the value each
director would be adding to the cOlnpany; thus, an aligrul1ent of pay and performance
would be achieved. The Greenbury C0111mittee attaches great inlpoliance to disclosure and
transparency. The effect of disclosing on an individual basis is that it would be easier for
shareholders to vote in favor or against the renluneration packages of each director based
271 King Il, Section 2.5.4
272 N Payne 'Conditions of the crown' May (2002) Accountancy SA
273 King Il, Section 2.4.3
274 King Il, Section 6(a)
275 King Il, Section 2.4.3
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on the value each director would be adding to the company; thus, an aligrunent of pay and
perfonllance would be achieved. King II denlands an individual disclosure as opposed to
the aggregate alnount of all directors being reported on. In this way, it is felt that non-
perfonning directors can easily be identified and it would be difficult for the board to
justify hefty packages that are not aligned to perfonllance. I(ing II further equates
disclosure to sunlight, in line with the principle of transparency and indicates that' sunlight
is the best disinfectant'. 276 King II notes that disclosure will lead to an exposition of
corruption, misconduct and poor perfolmance within the conlpany.277 It would therefore
aid in linkage of pay and perforn1ance. Not only is it perceived as aligning pay and
perfornlance, but it is believed it would decrease the wage gap that currently exists in South
Africa. Disclosure is regarded as a nleans of curbing fat cat pay.
Another classical recolnmendation suggested by King II and Greenbury report is that the
board of directors should delegate its powers over executive ren1uneration to an
independent renluneration comlnittee, which is to consist mainly of independent non-
executive directors. 278 This clause reads that 'COlnpanies should appoint a renluneration
cOlnnlittee or such other appropriate board conlnlittee, consisting entirely or lnainly of
independent non-executive directors, to nlake recommendations to the board within agreed
tenllS of reference on the conlpany's franlework of executive renluneration and to
detennine specific remuneration packages for each of executive directors. This IS,
ultilnately, the responsibility of the board. An independent non-executive director Inust
chair this comlnittee. In order to obtain his/her input on the renluneration of the other
executive the cOlnlnittee should consult the chief executive officer, who may attend
meetings by invitation. However, a chief executive should play no part in decisions
regarding his/her own relnuneration.' The idea is that because non-executive directors are
not involved in the day-to-day management of the cOlupany, this non-involvement gives
thenl the ability to act as a sounding board for executive directors and helps identify and
276 Sec 6(b)
277 Sec 6(c)
278 Clause 2.5.2 in King II and Para 1.12 of Greenbury report
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properly deal with conflicts of interest.279 Nevertheless, their distance from the daily affairs
of the company does not in any way diIninish their responsibilities as directors.
It was felt that executive directors would likely be faced with a potential conflict of
interests with regard to executive relnuneration. Greenbury Inoved for delegation of
responsibilities to a group of independent persons with the necessary expertise, knowledge
of the COlnpany business but who did not have any financial interest in the rellluneration
decisions they n1ade. 28oThe fact that the chairperson of the remuneration board Inust be an
independent non-executive director is stressed. 281 He must have nothing to do with the
operational functioning of the conlpany. It was felt that because non-executive directors are
not full tinle elnployees of the company, they would deal with issues of executive
remuneration in a more detached way and would then nlake recon1nlendations to the board.
The Hampel Comlnittee also endorsed this recollllllendation and it added that it should be
relnelnbered that the remuneration con1mittee is pari of the board and the latter is the one
that takes a final and collective responsibility?82 Schedule 22 restates what King II
recomlnends and supports the idea of creating renluneratiol1 comlnittees. 283
The Code of Best Practices Inakes provision for other iJnportant guidelines in respect of
director's ren1uneration. In telms of para 2.5.1, 'levels of remuneration should be sufficient
to attract, retain and lllotivate executives of the quality required by the board'.
Nevertheless, this silnp]e requirement suggests than an ilupoliant influence upon the level
of pay will be based on external labour Inarket constraints, which are based on conlparisons
with the pay levels of sinlilar executives in similar sized cOlnpanies. 284 In the strive towards
279 P Steyn 'Corporate governance' Corporate Werks Vo13 September 2002
280 Para 4.3 and 4.8
28\ 'Corporate governance series: Being a director,' duties and responsibilities' Institute of Directors
September 2000. The primary role of the remuneration conunittee is to ensure that the company's directors
and senior executives are fairly rewarded for their individual contributions to the company's overall
performance; and demonstrate to all stakeholders that the remuneration of senior executives is set by a
committee of board members who: have no personal interest in the outcome of their decisions; and to give
~~e regard to the interests of the shareholders and to the financial and conunercial health of the company.
Para 4.2 of its report
283 Para 22.7.1
284 K Keasey, M Wright C01porate Governance 1997, 6S
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balancing executive compensation and performance, provision of sufficient incentive to
align the interests of managers to those of the owners has to be carefully considered.
Para 2.5.2 stipulates that 'membership of the remuneration committee or board committee
that considers executive remuneration must be disclosed in the annual report and the
chairperson of such committee should attend annual general meeting to answer any
questions from shareowners' .
In terms of section 2.5.6, 'Share options may be granted to non-executive directors but
must be the subject of prior approval of shareowners (usually at the annual general
meeting) having regard also to the specific requirements of the COlnpanies Act. Because of
the apparent dilution of independence, in some international markets the view is that non
executive directors should preferably receive shares rather than share options.' Share
options are considered an essential element of performance incentives under Schedule
22.285 Even though share schemes are perceived as giving directors a personal financial
interest in seeing the share price rise, thus ensuring an alignment of shareholders and
directors' interests, it is often criticized as conferring windfall gains that have nothing to do
with directors' efforts. 286 Greenbury and Hampel both recommend that shareholders
should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term incentive plans, which
potentially commit shareholders funds over more than one year, or dilute the equity.287 In
this way, shareholders can be able to stlike down share options that they feel are not
justifiable under the circumstances.
In addition, clause 2.5.7 stipulates that where there is a proposal to re-price share options,
this should be the subject of prior shareowners approval and details should be provided of
each director's share options which stand to benefit from any such proposal. And then
again, if share options are to be issued at a discount to the ruling price, shareowners are to
vote separately on this clause in the trust deed. Greenbury totally discourages share options
285 Para 22.7.6
286 bGreen ury Report para 6.27 and para 6.28
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schemes that are granted at a discount. 288 It further moves that these options should not be
exercisable within a period of three years. 289 While other people may argue that share
options be retained as a way of aligning pay and performance, others may move for its total
.c 1 d' . 290eradication as an element of perlormance re ate Incentives.
These guiding principles were reiterated in the listing requirements of the JSE Securities
Exchange. Companies should be headed by an effective board, which can both lead and
control the company. The board should comprise a majority of non-executive directors, of
whom sufficient should be independent of management for minority interests to be
protected.
The King Code further envisages a situation where service contracts are not to exceed a
period of three years. It reconunends that if service contracts exceed tIns period, full
disclosure of this fact with reasons should be given and the consent of shareowners should
be obtained. Greenbury feels that to avoid payment of large severance packages in the
event of termination of services for unsatisfactory performance, service contracts should be
shortened to one year or less. 291 King II at para 3.5 states that 'every effort should be Inade
to promote acceptance of the necessity for, and benefits of, a realistic realignment of
director remuneration'. Further, requirements to disclose remuneration in annual reports is
seen as a constructive opportunity to communicate with shareholders on all aspects of
remuneration' .292
King II does not deal directly with the role of compensation consultants. In para 2.7.8, it
suggests that 'board committees should be free to take independent outside professional
advice as and when necessary'. Greenbury Committee also acknowledges that it is normal
for companies to retain and make use of such experts. It notes that these parties n1ust
however avail directors' advice that combines quality ofjudgment with independence. 293
288 Greenbury Report Para 6.29
289 Greenbury RepOli Para 6.34
290 See Chapter 5 on criticisms of recommendations.
291 G breen ury Report para 7. 11 and para 7.13
292 Para 3.5 of Appendix V to King II
')9~
- -' Paragraph 4.17
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King II further advices that non-executive directors should carefully consider the number
of directorship positions that they take up. This is merely to ensure that the companies on
which they serve enjoy the full benefit of their expertise, experience and knowledge.
Greenbury Committee, on the other hand, discourages direct cross-directorship
anangements. The Hampel committee, like King II, does not make an analysis in detail of
the role of compensation consultants and does not make any mention of cross directorships.
Schedule 22 of the JSE Listing Requirements does not directly address the cross-
directorships. The only inference that can be made that mention was made of these issues is
when at 2.5.2 states that remuneration cOlnmittees should be composed of independent
non-executive directors and the definition of independent director makes it clear that the
director must, among other things, 'be free from any business or other relationship which
could be seen to materially interfere with the individual's capacity to act in an independent
manner'. One can then advance an argument that cross directorships fall within the ambit
of this scenario.
Even though it may seem these recommendations go a long way towards addressing
concerns relating to executive remuneration, they have numerous drawbacks associated
with them. These shall be discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTERS
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS
In the light of the recommendations in the Codes previously discussed, it is clear that
shareholders want executives' remuneration packages tied to their real contribution to value
creation.294 Pay has to be seen to be bearing more correlation to perfom1ance. In this
chapter, one seeks to evaluate the recommendations made and whether they really do lead
to the link between pay and performance being created. Often, it is argued that if executive
directors receive substantial rewards when the company's situation is improving and
meaningful penalties when performance is poor, then it follows that they should place a
higher priority on doing what is best for shareholders. However, as previously discussed,
empirical statistics show that executive remuneration the world over is still not aligned to
performance. The different codes have been in place for some tin1e; notwithstanding,
remuneration packages are still spiraling out of control. Despite the efforts that have been
made in different quarters to try and address these issues, executive pay in South Africa
and the UK is still not structured as envisaged in the Codes. This chapter seeks to review
the need to examine the operation of the law and the Code of Good Practice.
5.1 DISCLOSURE
One major recommendation that King II, in chapter 4.1.13 makes is that fuller disclosure of
severance packages should be made. Greenbury also makes mention of this concern and
feels that it has to be addressed. 295 Often, there is no link between the golden handshakes
and performance. As was stressed earlier, these lucrative packages are awarded on
departure following poor share price performance. Disclosure is criticized by some
proponents who indicate that it can impact on the workforce in the sense that dramatic
294 T Mongalo 'Lots of filthy lucre: Shareholder activism in the UK may be signifying the failure of
remuneration committees' The Enterprise July 2003, 50
295 Para 1.7 and 7.2
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increases in pay levels can affect the morale within the company.296 It is also felt that
disclosure will affect productivity of employees. Thus, increased disclosure will lead to
increased demands of greater pay from other lower ranking employees in the company,
which may result in working strains and time waste.297
A number of other disadvantages of disclosure are leveled. Directors feel that disclosure
impacts negatively on their own personal and professionallives. 298 Not only is it regarded
as an infringement of their privacy, but their security is threatened as well. 299 It is felt that it
would impact negatively on the work environment as top paying firms can easily lure away
staff of other lower paying companies. On discovery of what other directors in comparable
companies earn, the more powerful companies will entice directors to better paying
positions in their own companies. This results in other companies losing valuable skills and
workers.
In as much as Section 297 of the Companies Act mandates that companies disclose aspects
of the aggregate amount of compensation paid to directors, it is submitted that disclosure
has no effect whatsoever in curbing handsome awards being made and narrowing down the
wage gap that still exists in South Africa. Instead of being linked to remuneration, the
remuneration packages are still spiraling out of control with no link to performance
whatsoever. There is no evidence that can be adduced to prove that the desired effect has
been achieved. On the contrary, the issue of executive pay has caused lTIuch more concern
as corporate directors are still accepting huge gains on share options and golden
handshakes among other components. It is submitted that instead of achieving the results as
anticipated by King II and Greenbury, disclosure leads to continued increase of executive
pay.
'>96 Hie .- ampe ommlttee
297 W Phelps 'Reigning in executive pay and perks' 15 August 2002 http://www.startribune.com/stories
298 Anonymous 'Why still the secrecy around directors remuneration' South African Labour Bulletin April
2002
299 Ibid. It is felt that disclosure makes them easy targets for kidnappings and extortion.
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5.2 REMUNERATION COMMITTEES
Both the South African and UK Codes of Corporate Practice and the JSE Listing
Requirements endorse the establishment of remuneration committees. Clause 2.5.2 of the
Code in King II and para 4.3 of the Greenbury Report state that 'companies should appoint
a remuneration committee or such other appropriate board committee, consisting entirely or
mainly of independent non-executive directors, to make recommendations to the board
within agreed terms of reference on the company's framework of executive remuneration
and to determine specific remuneration packages for each of executive directors. This is,
ultimately, the responsibility of the board. An independent non-executive director must
chair this committee. In order to obtain hislher input on the remuneration of the other
executive the committee should consult the chief executive officer, who may attend
meetings by invitation. However, a chief executive should play no part in decision
regarding his/her own remuneration.'
It is believed that because non-executive directors are not full time employees like
executive directors of the company, they will exercise their independence and good
knowledge for the benefit of the company and they will not have a direct financial interest;
as such, they will not act in a self serving manner. Thus, because of their independence, it
is hoped that they will assess issues pertaining to executive remuneration in a more
detached manner and be in a position to make recommendations to the board of
directors.30o The Hampel Committee at para 4.12 also endorsed this recommendation.
Remuneration committees (RC's) have however not proved to be effective at all in
eradicating offensively high executive pay.30l As Mongalo indicates, there is no evidence
that companies with remuneration committees paid their executives lesser packages than
those companies which do not have RCs. 302 Neither can it be said that there is more linkage
of performance and pay. There is no evidence fUliher to show that the rift that exists
'00.) T Mongalo Lots of filthy lucre: 50, 51
301 UK's Sunday Times, 31 October 1999 as quoted in T Mongalo (note 280 above)
302 Ibid
83
between pay at the bottom and pay at the top has decreased gradually since the introduction
of these committees. For one, para 2.5.2 of the Code of Good Practices and Conduct
stipulates that the chief executive officer of the company should be consulted and may
attend the remuneration committee meetings. Even though such director will play no part in
the determination of his or her own salary, in that such party's salary has to be decided in
their absence, the fact that they are made party to the committee acts in their favour in that
directors ultimately award their colleagues high pay package increases in the hope that
when their own turn comes, their colleagues would reciprocally be generous. This can be
justified by the fact that since the introduction of corporate law reforms in this area, we
have not seen any narrowing of the pay gap between directors and rank and file employees.
Bias also remains a concern over the non-executive directors' independence. Non-
executive directors are nominated by the nomination committee who work with the
chairman of the board of directors over such selections. As such, these individuals may be
reluctant to antagonize and question generous executive pay packages recommended.303
This matter is exacerbated by the fact that the CEO is to attend at remuneration committee
meetings on an advisory basis. A number of other criticisms are leveled against
remuneration committees.
5.3 COMPENSATION EXPERTS
To begin with, the King II promotes that the committees should engage independent
consultants or advisors. King II, at para 2.7.8 recommends that 'Board committees should
be free to take independent outside professional advice as and when necessary'. Greenbury
Repoli at para 4.7 makes an acknowledgement that professional advice should be sought,
which advice is to combine quality judgment with independence. The practice in South
Africa and the UK is that the board of directors itself will engage compensation experts.
They are not hired by remuneration committees; as such their independence is really
questionable. Even though these compensation experts can prove beneficial to the
company, it is argued that because they are well informed about what other companies in
comparable companies are paying, they do not exercise their independence. Their
303 Cheffms. T Thomas 'Should shareholders have a greater say over executive pay 277,286
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objectivity is open to question.304 This is mainly because for them to secure clientele, they
tend to recommend sky-high packages. This assists them in that they will not acquire a
reputation for recommending frugal packages within management circles.305 For these
reasons, it is felt that these compensation experts will justify hefty remuneration packages
regardless of the fact that they would not be aligned in any way to company
performance.306
5.4 CROSS DIRECTORSHIP
King II in clause 2.4.5 of the Code encourages appointments of a majority of non-
executives to sit in remuneration committees. However, as noted in previous chapters, one
in two directors in South Africa will sit as a non-executive director in other companies.
This is problematic in that in setting remuneration packages of executives, these non-
executive directors are perceived to be indirectly setting their own pay.307 As Mongalo
says, 'they are setting, albeit indirectly, the going rate for executive pay in a more general
sense' .308 Their independence is questionable in this regard. Even though it is unclear
whether the no-conflict rule prohibits a person from being a director of competing
companies,309 it is submitted that this directly impacts on their fiduciary duty of avoiding a
conflict of interests. Because they sit as non-executive directors, they would indirectly
benefit, as the recommendations they make will influence what the comparator market has
304 BR Cheffms Company law, theory structure and operation, 667; See also T Mongalo 'Corporate
governance refonns and directors' remuneration, a critical comparative analysis: Part 2,\(unpublished article)
9
305 BR Cheffins (Note 296 above) 667; T Mongalo, Enterprise, 52
306 Some Scholars argue that these compensation experts can justify excessive remuneration packages by
indicating that the company should not lose talented executives by paying them poorly. All of this is done
notwithstanding the fact that the company will be perfonning badly. It is further argued that in some
instances, they tend to justify these packages by saying that executives should receive high pay as the
company might be getting behind. Therefore, their recommendation to increase packages ensures that the
overall pay in the company rises to the average pay in the comparator market even tough corporate
perfonnance may be poor. Ibid; Cheffins, 667
'07-' BR Cheffms (Note 296 above), 669
308 Ibid, 52
309 In London & Mashonaland Exploration co Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration co Ltd (1891) WN 165
Chitty J refused to restrain a director who had never acted as a director or attended a board meeting of the
plaintiff company from acting as director of the competing defendant company. In another case, Bell and
Another v Lever Brothers Limited and Others (1932) AC 161 (HL), 195, Blanesburgh LC considered this
case as authority for a general statement that a director is nOlmally free to be a director of a competing
company.
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to offer on average. King II and the JSE Listing Rules do not make an analysis of the role
played by compensation experts and both make no mention of directors avoiding sitting on
different boards and advising on executive remuneration. Neither does the Hampel
Committee deal with the issue of cross directorship. The Greenbury Report, on the other
hand, at para 4.8 explicitly discourages the practice of cross-directorship. However, it
would seem that remuneration committees are not really the solution to the concerns that
culminated into reforms in this area of corporate governance.
5.5 OTHER PROBLEMS POSED BY THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The problem that a company that wishes to enforce a strict policy on linking pay and
performance so as to be able to justify hefty packages is that such a company will be met
with difficulties. It is not an appealing idea and not feasible to have directors' pay
fluctuating on a monthly basis as a result of a company trying to align pay and
perfonnance. One can argue that the directors will probably leave the company for much
more stable surroundings and as such, the company will lose the skill and experience that
the director had. 310 King II reiterates this fact at para 4.9.
It is submitted that it is not in all cases that the share price will plummet as a result of the
non-performance of directors. As Mongalo points out 'a variety of factors unrelated to the
skill and effort of the top management will influence a company's share price,.311 There are
peculiar instances that may lead to an economic boom or market crash.312 Moreover, the
strength of the market will influence share prices regardless of what the individual
executive might do in terms of performance. 313 It is felt that a director should not be
penalized for the fall in share prices because non-performance is not the only factor that
may affect shareholders' equity.314 In any event, often, the performance of an executive
310 Aslam 'u.s pay gap widens' 2 November 1999 http://www.globalpolicy.org
311 T Mongalo 'Corporate governance reforms and directors remuneration, a critical comparative analysis:
Part 2,20
312 See note 33 above
313 T Mongalo (note 289 above)
314 BR Cheffms (Note above), at 681 indicates that even if share prices constituted a reliable estimate of a
company's future earnings stream they do not necessarily provide an accurate indication of an executive's
efforts or abilities.
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director is not visible and cannot be measured until after several years have gone by. Even
then, only the most skilled observer or board of directors can be able to detect this non-
performance.
The other problem posed by a strict alignment of performance and pay relates to the swings
in the executive director's income. It follows that if pay is tight to share price performance,
such package will fluctuate dramatically periodically depending on how well the share
price is performing. Thus, because individuals would prefer to earn a stable income, the
strict linkage of pay and performance leads to an unsatisfactory option to pursue. Cheffins
indicates that a key element of the argunlent in favour of tying managerial pay to corporate
performance is that senior executives are self-interested individuals who need financial
incentives to exert their best efforts.315 Hence, if a strict application of linking pay and
performance is made, they would be demotivated and would not perform at such high
levels as expected of them.
Furthermore, King II in para 2.5.1 recommends that 'levels of remuneration should be
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate executives of the quality required by the board'. It
is felt that the global business world is a very competitive market; as such, because of its
nature, companies compensate its directors services handsomely based on the comparator
market. By restraining companies and forcing them to enforce strict policies of aligning
pay and performance, it would be very difficult for a company adhering to these policies to
secure highly qualified executives who would endeavour to maximize shareholder return
and generate expected profits. Rather, such qualified experts would leave for greener
pastures where they would be better paid for the services they render.
Para 2.5.6 of the King Code stipulates that 'share options may be granted to non executive
directors but must be the subject of prior approval of shareowners (usually at the annual
general meeting) having regard also to the specific requirements of the Companies Act.
Because of the apparent dilution of independence, in some international markets the view is
that non executive directors should preferably receive shares rather than share options.' It is
31') BR Cheffms (Note above), 679
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not very easy to justify share options, given the fact that the directors that benefit there
from are highly paid executives. Often, such awards are seen as greediness on the part of
directors and lead to accusations of shareholder exploitation.316 It is suggested herein that
companies do away with granting share options to directors, as they can never be perfectly
aligned to performance. Even though King II does not outlaw the granting of share
incentive schemes to non-executive directors, it is submitted that these are undesirable in
that we cannot have the same incentives (share options) that are similar to those afforded to
executive directors being awarded to non-executive directors. These are the very people
who King II suggests should sit in remuneration committees (remuneration committee,
which are to consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors). As a result, it
becomes very difficult for non-executive directors to exercise restraint, and to make
decisions on incentives for executives without a conflict of interest. Non-executive
directors should not be allowed to participate in the company's annual bonus plan, share
option scheme or long term incentive plan.
As was earlier noted, Schedule 22 of the Listing Requirements in 22.7.10 reads that 'no
director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration'. However, by
engaging them in share options, they are in a way setting their own pay, which runs
contrary to this principle. By awarding them share options, their independence will be
diluted, which is an essential quality, which they should bring to the board's
deliberations. 317
Furthermore, at para 2.5.6, King II suggests that 'performance related elements of
remuneration should constitute a substantial proportion of the total remuneration package
of executives in order to align their interests with those of the shareowners, and should be
designed to provide incentives to perform at the highest operational standards.'
316 M Henderson 'Creating a two-tier labour force (March 2002) Accountancy SA 17
317 'Para 4.12 of the Cadbury's Report
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CHAPTER 6
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONTEXT
The main difference between the Cadbury and King Reports is that King's terms of
reference were much wider than those of Cadbury as they included the matter investigated
by Cadbury as well as a Code of Ethical Practice for business in South Africa. 318 The report
was drafted during the period of the important 1993 elections in South Africa and therefore
deals with the practicalities of affirmative action. It states that it is vital to recognize that
strategies to reduce inequality must be based on the commercial reason that the strategies
are necessary to survive and thrive in the new South Africa. 319
6.1 THE STAKEHOLDER MODEL OF GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
The primary goal of business in the apartheid era was essentially the maximization of
shareholders' wealth. With the advent of corporate governance reforms, the business is to
include not only a wealth creating focus, but has also to include activities which would
contribute to the distribution of wealth and income so as to enable the larger South African
community to benefit from a more extensive scope of corporate social responsibility.32o
The stakeholder model is premised on the theory that there are groups, in addition to
shareholders, who have claims on a corporation's assets and earnings. Employees, as one
of the interest groups are seen as having a different claim from shareholders and creditors
over the company's assets. Its financial contribution to the company is in the form of
human capital and this model advocates for protection of employees interests. 321 King II
draws heavily on this model. King II makes an attempt to influence the level of care and
skill that is required from directors to permit them to engage the corporation in activities
318 JJ Du Plessis 'Corporate governance: Some reflections on the South African law and the German two-tier
board system' (1996) 4 CRIC 29,34
319 King I, Chapter 17 Para 4 Appendix on Affirmative Action
320 D Botha 'Confusion in the King report' (1996) 8 SA Merc L1 26, 29
321 Ibid, 35
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for public benefit, regardless of whether shareholder gain IS specifically enhanced. It
recognizes the need to strengthen and enhance the standards of managerial accountability
and recognizes executive remuneration as one of the problem areas in existing systems
within companies where a differentiation is made between ownership and management.
6.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S DISTINCT CHARACTERISTICS AND CONCERNS
The King committee was tasked with a mandate to have regard to the special circumstances
existing in South Africa, more particularly the entrance into the business community of
members of disadvantaged communities. 322 During the apartheid era, all aspects of
socioeconomic and political well being were governed by racially discriminatory laws.
These discriminatory laws had, by the time apartheid was dismantled, created such racial
inequities that meaningful efforts had to be taken to redress them.323 In order to try and give
the marginalized majority of previously disadvantaged people access to capital and to try
and allow them into the business, affirmative action had to be encompassed not only in the
Constitution324 as part of the right to equality, but King I and II also gave it recognition. 325
It is considered as good governance practice. The all inclusive measures adopted for the
betterment of corporate governance practices takes not only the shareholders interests, but
it also redresses the inequalities of the past which were created by segregation laws.
6.2.1 ERADICATION OF THE APARTHEID WAGE GAP
The main concern in South Africa is then to eradicate the apartheid wage gap between
executives and rank and file employees. In a jurisdiction where the majority of previously
disadvantaged individuals are black, who previously could not engage in skilled work
because of the apartheid laws, they comprise the majority of rank and file employees in
322 D Botha 'Confusion in the King report' (1996) 8 SA Mere LJ 27,37
323 T Mongalo 'COlporate governance reforms and directors' remuneration, a critical comparative analysis:
Part 1,22
324 The Constitution of South Africa 1996
325 King I Chapter 8; King IT Chapter 5, section 4
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listed companies.326 As a result, a dramatic increase in executive pay may be seen, more
especially by the unions, as the perpetuation of apartheid policy and the strengthening of
the apartheid wage gap.327 In this environment, a growing wage disparity can create
problems since it offends notions of equality that workers may have. 328This is one of the
reasons why it is felt that King II might have erred for suggesting that the unitary system
modeled along the Anglo American system is the ideal system for South Africa. It failed to
consider the advantages of a two-tier board structure, which has employee representation in
the upper supervisory board. It is submitted that employee participation and concentrated
shareholding may encourage better corporate governance. It is seen as a promotion of
equality between all persons with equal rights. As one writer had to say
A well-ordered system of private ownership is a means of promoting human dignity
and liberty and assures personal security to the individual. It is indispensable for the
exercise of personal initiative and, finally, it constitutes a right, which is united
intimately with human activity, a right which derives its strength and virtue from
the fruitfulness of employees. The owner of property must not use it selfishly
without regard to the social purposes which it would serve. Thus, private property
must be safeguarded, but where protection of private rights is concerned, special
regard must be had for the unpropertied. We do not deny that, for a state to exist at
all, there have to be differences of degree among its citizens, and these differences
will persist, however much forms of government change. However, the state should
intervene vigorously on behalf of the unpropertied employees, It is not possible for
everyone to contribute in the same way or to an equal extent. The capital provider
should have no superior position over the employee in society or before the law.
They are equals with equal rights. The state must intervene whenever the public
interest or a part of a particular class is harmed or endangered.329
326 T Mongalo, 22
327 Ibid
328 BR Cheffins (Note above), 658
329 M Yavasi 'Shareholding and board structures of German and U.K companies' (2001) The Company
Lawyer 47,51
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6.2.2 SOUTH AFRICAN DECREASED LEVELS OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM WITHIN COMPANIES
With regard to granting shareholders much more say in approving individual remuneration
packages of directors, the position in South Africa is that often, if shareholders are granted
vast voting powers in the determination of executive remuneration, they most probably are
not going to exercise the rights; rather they tend to rubberstamp the recommendations made
by the remuneration committee.33o Shareholders feel that remuneration committees are
better placed to deal with issues pertaining to executive remuneration. They feel that
because the committee would have made various consultations with remuneration experts
and have had an opportunity to weigh the packages against what other situated companies
are paying, they are better positioned to handle such issues. For this reason, shareholders
would be more inclined to say that the remuneration cOlnmittee is better positioned to deal
with these decisions. This can be justified by the fact that in South Africa, we have not seen
to date any activism of shareholders within companies. Unlike recent developments in the
UK, where shareholders of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) recently struck down executive
packages, we have not had cases of shareholders voting against directors' pay. It is hoped
that with increased shareholder activism, South African companies could possibly see more
alignment being achieved of pay and performance and that interests of all other
stakeholders, in particular, employees will be taken cognizance of before executive
remuneration packages are decided.
Though King proposes that shareholders be granted more say over performance related
executive remuneration setting, when we draw upon the experience in the UK and the US,
where empirical studies indicate that shareholder voting only operates as a potential check
when pay arrangements deviate far from the norm,331 in the South African context, these
findings imply that implementing the shareholder oriented reforms that have been
canvassed would fail to address fully the concerns raised by critics of executive pay. It is
330 BR Cheffms (Note 296 above), 670 The author indicates that in most instances, shareholders have taken a
'hands off approach.
331 DTI, 'Byers to strengthen link between pay and pel10rmance' Press Release P/2001l132 (7 March 2001);
R Shrimsley and S Targett, 'Spotlight on Executive Pay Deals', Financial Times, 8 March 2001,33.
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felt that shareholders do not often attend meetings and if they do, they hardly ever apply
their minds to the resolutions proposed.332As Cheffins suggests, it is unlikely that
shareholders will see this as a serious problem and may understand that generous
remuneration can be required to align pay and performance and to attract and retain
talented executives.333 However, shareholder involvement may have some impact or
potential to increase adherence to corporate governance standards and in particular, to
decisions made by directors on setting pay. It is felt that it is not likely to cause any adverse
consequences in South Africa.
Even though King II proposes that shareholders be granted more say over performance
related executive remuneration setting, when we draw upon the experience in the OK and
the US, where empirical studies indicate that shareholder voting only operates as a
potential check when pay arrangements deviate far from the norm,334 in the South African
context, these findings imply that implementing the shareholder oriented reforms that have
been canvassed would fail to address fully the concerns raised by critics of executive pay.
It is felt that shareholders do not often attend meetings and if they do, they hardly ever
apply their minds to the resolutions proposed.335As Cheffins suggests, it is unlikely that
shareholders will see this as a serious problem and may understand that generous
remuneration can be required to align pay and performance and to attract and retain
talented executives.336 However, shareholder involvement may have some impact or
potential to increase adherence to corporate governance standards and in particular, to
decisions made by directors on setting pay. It is felt that it is not likely to cause any adverse
consequences in South Africa.
332 T Mongalo 'Two steps forward, one step backl: Directors J duty to act for the benefit ofthe company
revisited in the aftermath ofcorporate governance rel"orms ' 5
333 :}l ,
BR Cheffms Company Law the01Y structure and operation, 694
334 DTI, 'Byers to strengthen link between pay and pelformance' Press Release P/2001l132 (7 March 2001);
~_Shrimsley and S Targett, 'Spotlight on Executive Pay Deals', Financial Times, 8 March 2001,33 .
.J.J) T Mongalo 'Two steps forward, one step backJ: Directors' duty to act for the benefit ofthe company
revisited in the aftermath ofcorporate governance rel"orms' 5
336 . :}l ,
BR Cheffms Company Law the01Y structure and operation, 694
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6.2.3 INCREASED LEVEL OF CROSS DIRECTORSHIP HOLDINGS WITHIN
COMPETING COMPANIES
During the apartheid regime, we had a system characterized by a concentration of power
within the hands of a few individuals or companies. As a result, many business enterprises
became nests of complex cross holdings. 337 Inasmuch as King II recommends that directors
should be weary of the number of directorships they take up in different companies, to
enable the particular companies to benefit fully from their expertise and knowledge, in
South Africa, one in two directors holds directorships in other competing companies.338
Evidence from P3 Management Consultants' survey indicates that in the ten highest paying
South African companies, over half the members of each company remuneration
committee cUlTently serve as executive directors on other companies. 339 In the new South
Africa where black economic empowerment is promoted, it is felt that greater opportunities
being availed previously disadvantaged individuals would decrease the burden of having to
sit in many boards and would therefore reduce the level of conflicting interests within
companies in making remuneration recommendations to the board. Greenbury Committee
forsaw the problems associated with such holdings and totally discouraged cross holdings.
6.2.4 LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND SEGMENTAL DISCLOSURE
King proceeds on the premise that there was a separation of ownership from control and
therefore improving accountability was seen as paramount. King II's main emphasis was
placed on standards of managerial accountability or the reduction of 'agency costs'. This is
why emphasis is made on the roles played by non-executive directors, shareholders and
others in holding management to account for its actions. 34o Disclosure IS seen as an
important ingredient of being held accountable. However, in South Africa, listed
companies pay inadequate attention even to the simplest requirements of the Code of
337 T Mongalo 'Corporate governance issues requiring urgent attention in South Africa? An analysis'
(Unpublished article), 3
'38-' T Mongalo (Note above),
339 These conclusions were drawn from the 2000 and 2001 Fortune magazine and Hay Group (P3
Management) surveys of the world's most admired companies.
340 Ibid, 5
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Conduct outlined in King's reports. Transparency and segmental disclosure appear to be
absent in most corporations, with only the top 30-40 companies introducing certain
performance measures.341 The CEO of the Peoples Bank indicates that disclosure
delTIotivates millions of black people because there are not enough black people in top
positions, this will further decrease their perception about the corporate strata keeping in
mind that during the apartheid regime people of colour were not allowed to progress all the
d 342way up the corporate lad er.
With greater enhancement of black economic empowerment, it is felt that we will see a
greater number of top positions being taken up by previously disadvantaged people and the
concerns raised in setting pay packages being addressed to a greater extent. However, while
it is acknowledged that directors have various skills and expertise that are utilized to
generate maximum profits for the company, given the South African situation, and the level
of skill required of directors, companies will keep increasing their pay as an incentive to
keep the company running. If there was an increase in skilled and experienced workers,
there would not be need for such measures.
6.2.5 LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERTISE OF LOW RANKING
EMPLOYEES
Inasmuch as efforts are being made to try and wage the gap between top ranking executives
and file employees, the problem in South Africa is that most file ranking employees who
comprise of a majority of blacks do not hold the necessary expertise and qualifications to
engineer the company and to make informed decisions on enhancing shareholder value and
equity. As such, while trying to deal with these imbalances, their own performance has to
be aligned to their pay, and it would be quite difficult to close down the gap between these
different sets of people who serve the company differently. Executive recruitment market
has become more aggressive in recent years. Companies are now engaged in a war that is
fought for talent, which in South Africa is in short supply. For these reasons, if companies
341 A Kakabadse 'Corporate governance in South Africa: Evaluation ofthe King If Report' 305,307
342 Anonymous 'Why still the secrecy around directors remuneration' South African Labour Bulletin April
2002
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insist on linking pay to performance, they would have difficulties in attracting or retaining
talented executives. It is submitted that a strict alignment of interests of employees and
shareholders will be realistically impossible to achieve. Neither will it be easy to reduce the
wage gap to such levels as would be regarded as acceptable within South African business
environment and vigilant labour movements.
Furthermore, in considering the special circumstances prevailing in South Africa, the
Committee accepted the concept of not permitting the same individual to be the chairman
and the chief executive officer. It however noted that there are many instances in South
Africa where the position of chairman and chief executive are held by one person or
combined by force of circumstances. 343 Depending on the size of each company, some
companies may decide it to be more cost effective to have one individual holding these
positions. Because it is left in the companies discretion to decide whether or not to separate
the two, often, companies would rather not pay than incur extra expenses which it may feel
is unwarranted. The King committee however doubted whether there is, in South Africa, a
sufficient pool of trained and experienced people available to serve as non-executive
directors. It acknowledged that as a result of this limited pool of skilled people, conflicts of
interest often arise. 344
6.2.6 DECREASED LEVELS OF JOB MOBILIZATION
Although King II feels that the levels of remuneration in South Africa should be sufficient
in order to attract, retain and motivate quality executives to boards, it is felt that even
though they have to be attractive, companies should not lose sight of the linkage of pay and
performance of each individual executive. In our context, executive directors do not shift
between different jobs all the time. Their movement within companies has been very low;
as such there is no need to fear that if a strict policy is taken to align their interest to
shareholders by linking pay and performance, they will most likely leave for greener
343 King I, Clause 2.6.1
344 King I, Clause 2.6.2
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pastures. It is felt that chances of executives leaving for greener pastures when they are
dissatisfied are limited and therefore exaggerated.
6.2.7 ADOPTION OF REMUNERATION COMMITTES AND THE
INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE LEVELS OF PAY PACKAGES
With regard to remuneration committees, although King II motivates for their
establishment, there is currently no legal requirement for South African companies to spell
out governance structures or to even explain the principles behind setting remuneration
packages. Existing evidence reflects and supports the view that public companies are, to
some extent, adhering to the King recommendations. 345 More companies are however
responding to the King recommendations and are revealing the existence of remuneration
committees in their company reports.346 However, the current extent of compensation
disclosure in COlnpany accounts is woefully inadequate. The information disclosed is left to
the discretion of individual companies. Under current reporting rules, there is really
insufficient information to properly value performance related incentives and other issues
in a systematic way across companies. The adoption of remuneration committees alone
does not guarantee the setting of appropriate pay levels. To a limited extend, the
recommendations of King II are to be welcomed as they create a formal structure for top
pay setting. Shareholders are now better informed about remuneration decisions than ten
years ago. However, for these decisions to be regarded as truly independent, other
principles have to be taken into account.
345 Kakabadse 'Corporate governance in South Afi-ica: Evaluation ofthe King If report' 305, 313
346 Ibid
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6.2.8 ANGLO AMERICAN BOARD STRUCTURE EVIDENCES LACK OF
INDEPENDENCE
The Anglo American structure adopted by King does not evidence any form of
independence of the board in setting corporate directors pay. Even though the Code of
Corporate Practices clearly indicates that executive directors should not play any role in the
detennination of their own pay packages, there is still a significant number of executives
sitting in boards. In most of the South African listed companies, the chief executive
director or chairman actually sits on the remuneration committee. Even though he has to
absent himself when his pay is tabled, it is felt that there is a potential problem in that if as
chair he decides on who to nominate and how much to pay other members, he detennines
indirectly, his own pay package.
6.3 CONCLUSION
It is felt that in South Africa, given the countries past socio political and economic situation
under apartheid, issues pertaining to black economic empowerment require urgent
attention. Failure to address these imbalances could be viewed as failure of the self-
regulatory system of corporate governance. As such, one can move that the Codes be
supported by some form of legislation to try and deal with these concerns. As observed by
Kihumba, 'self regulation codes have some weaknesses and limitations which can only be
cured by official regulations' .347 He goes on to say 'legislative enactment may be made
stronger by the fact that it may have 'stronger and sharper teeth and hence able to reach
where self regulated codes are weak'. It is felt therefore that a case for legally binding
regulation of methods of setting executive compensation packages should be looked into.
347 Kihumba 'Setting governance policies: Codes or regulations?' Global corporate governance trust
conference, Connecticut, 10 July 2000. http://www.gcgf.org/library/speeches/Kihumba.doc as quoted in T
Mongalo 'Self-regulation versus statutory codification: Should the new regime ofcorporate governance be




The legal systems investigated above recognize the need for control of company
management. One method of achieving this control is by means of a supervisory board as
found in the German system.
7.1 THE GERMANIC TWO TIER BOARD STRUCTURE VIS-A-VIS
UNITARY SYSTEM
It should be remembered that in South African companies, authority to determine executive
pay customarily rests in the hands of the board of directors. 348 By virtue of the composition
of company boards, this can pose a problem in that by setting directors remuneration
collectively, they may effectively be able to determine what to pay themselves. There are
essentially two forms of corporate governance structure. First, the South African corporate
governance structure, which represents the Anglo-American corporate governance
structure, has a single-tier board of directors. The board lays down broad principles, makes
major decisions, selects officers and agents, and has officers who execute those policies.349
In the single-tier system, executive and non-executive directors sit on one board. Secondly,
in the German two-tier board structure, a supervisory board, which is not involved in the
day to day running of, the business watches over the managers and reports on them to the
shareholders.35o The two-tier board structure is devised in a manner that there are two
levels, the supervisory level that is comprised of shareholders and employee
representatives. 35 1 This division of responsibilities was designed to afford shareholders a
body, which could act for them to check, supervise and correct the active management. It
has two levels; the upper supervisory board and the lower management board. All
348 R Cheffins, R Thomas 'Should shareholders have a greater say over executive pay?: Learning from the US
experience' Vol 1 Part 2 December 2001 Journal ofCorporate Law Studies 277, 284
349 M Yavasi 'Shareholding and board structures of Gelman and UK companies' The Company Lawyer vol
22 (2) February 2001 47,48
350 German Public Limited Liability companies Act of 1965, Section 111
351 T Salzberger 'Three ideas for the two tier board approach' http:www.legamedia.net
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interested parties are represented on the supervisory boards. This board system has
employee representatives in the upper supervisory board.
Therefore, shareholders and other parties can make use of control rights over the managers.
The upper supervisory board consists of 50 per cent of shareholder elected representatives
and 50 per cent of individuals elected by the employees. 352 The supervisory board is totally
independent and does not take any part whatsoever in the management of the company. Its
main role is to supervise and monitor the management board. With the exception of
employee representatives, members of the supervisory board are elected by the
shareholders. The supervisory board appoints and removes the management board. This
means that the supervisory board is the second supreme organ of a company after the
general meeting of the shareholders. 353 Supervisory boards cannot have overlapping
membership with the management board.
In South Africa, King II recommends that guidance be sought from remuneration
committees, which are to be composed of a majority of outside directors. However, as seen
earlier, these have proved deficient in many respects. It is submitted that where all
stakeholders are party to decision making, voting against the company's accounts when
presented at the board meetings can exert pressure on directors who award themselves
hefty packages. It is unlikely that they would recommend packages that are over the 'odds'
when they know that there are watchdogs overlooking their conduct. The unitary system as
it currently applies in South Africa and other jurisdictions is such that executive and non-
executive directors sit in the same board and attend meetings together. As such, it becomes
very difficult for non-executive directors to monitor or supervise their own colleagues. 354
Non-executive directors in a unitary board structure will find it untenable to supervise or
act as watchdogs to their executive colleagues. Thus, expecting them to play a pivotal role
in influencing reasonable executive pay level would be to ask too much of them. For these
352 T Mongalo ' Corporate governance reforms: Part 2, 22
353 TJ Andre' 'Some reflections on German Corporate governance: A glimpse at German supervisory boards'
Tulane LR Vol 70 (1996) 1819, 1822
354 Some scholars indicate that they get to know each other on a personal level, more especially where there
are cross directorships within companies.
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reasons, a two-tier board system may be the solution to the probleln of offensively high
executive pay levels.
There are some demands from organized labour in South Africa that worker participation at
board level should be made compulsory.355 Cosatu and other labour movements propose
that 'the principle of granting workers the right to elect fifty per cent of the Inembers on
company boards be agreed' .356 It is proposed that a two-tier board structure may work
much better in the South African context than the unitary system. The whole idea behind
corporate governance reforms was to operate the company in a way that gives cognizance
to all stakeholders' interests, including employees and shareholders. Given the peculiar
circumstances of South Africa, King II ought to have taken the all inclusive approach of
corporate governance to greater lengths and should have recommended changes to the core
of directors' duties in order to accommodate the interests of different stakeholders.
357
It
should not have followed the Anglo American approach which disregards to a great extent,
the interests and roles of stakeholders within the company. It is felt that the unitary system
has proved a failure in this regard. These parties are nominated to these positions in order
that they can be able to question the board when excessively high amounts are paid to
directors.
It is felt that remuneration committees do not seem to work in a manner that works towards
curtailing executive pay. Because these committees comprise solely of directors, they tend
to be bias when detenninations of executive pay are made; thus, as already seen, they set,
in their own way, their own pays. Introducing employees to this level will ensure a Inuch-
needed sense of balance in the setting of executive remuneration. 358 It is noted however,
that it does have its own shortfalls. It is understood that employees (low ranking) and
shareholders may lack the necessary expertise and skill with regards to what constitutes
setting executive remuneration. However, these do not outweigh the benefits that can be
355 The South African Labour Movement Social Equity and Job Creation: The key to a stable future issued by
!he Labour Caucus at Nedlac, incorporating Cosatu, Nactu and Fedsal (1996) 34 par 5.3
-,56 Ibid
357 T Mongalo 'Corporate governance issues requiring urgent attention in South Ajj'ica? An analysis,
(Unpublished article), 9
358 BR Cheffins, 673
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ripped by engaging and or adopting the Germanic independent two-tier board system. With
the proper training and engagenlent of qualified professional consultants, these parties can
play a pivotal role in executive remuneration decision making than if these decisions are
just delegated to executive directors who are unable to generate expected returns purely on
the basis that they impose increased agency costs on shareholders. Boards can appoint
competent persons to sit in these committees.
It is felt that in addressing the apartheid wage gap that exists in South Africa, the two-tier
board with employee representatives in the supervisory board would address this concern.
A two tier board structure, although undoubtedly slower, and probably operationally more
frustrating, could provide the structural conduit for balancing the interests of all
stakeholders.
The two-tier board system is not only beneficial in the context discussed above; it has an
advantage over the unitary board structure in that where a company has been wronged, and
it has to be determined who has to sue, it would be unacceptable to have a resolution not to
sue carrying the votes of potential defendants. 359 A decision to condone taken by a board
under the wrongdoer or his supporters would be a travesty. The two-tier system prevents
this problem as an independent board has power to condone a wrong committed against the
company. It was however indicated in Chapter 3 that under our current regime,
condonation cannot be achieved in prejudice situations and therefore, excessive executive
remuneration awards should not be ratifiable wrongs as it constitutes a fraud on the
minority.36o However, because an independent board has power to condone wrongs, the
rules could possibly be relaxed and the wrongs committed (awarding exorbitant
remuneration in total disregard of company interests) could be regarded as falling outside
the purview of unratifiable wrongs as propounded in the case of Prudential Assurance Co
Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and Others. 361 The Germanic two-tier system provides
answers to many of the compelling problems associated with the unitary system. Through
359 J McLennan 'Wrongs to company: Condonation', SALJ 136
'60 '.) See also J McLennan (Ibid), 139
361 Note 176 above
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this system, a broader spectrum of interests in the company are formally recognized and it
ensures that exclusive shareholder and director control is not the norm anymore. 362
7.2 EXPANSION OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Disclosure requirements do not act as deterrence to the curtailment of executive
remuneration. The JSE Listing rules still grant companies leverage to decide whether or not
to disclose remuneration packages. As such, corrupt directors may still find the need to fail
to disclose packages, which they well know that shareholders at the AGM may query. The
Listing requirements just indicate that reasons for non-disclosure should be revealed. It is
recommended that in South Africa, disclosure requirements modeled along the newly
introduced UK disclosure regulations be adopted in the Companies Act. The government
should make disclosure requirements more onerous. Our disclosure regulations have to be
restructured so that shareholders can have the necessary information to enable them to
assess a company's policy on boardroom pay. A publicly quoted company would have to
then divulge a wider range of information dealing with the link between pay and
performance, including performance graphs that highlight where matters stand. It is felt
that full disclosure with justifications will embarrass overpaid executives and will grant
shareholders much more leverage to ensure that pay is linked to performance. This is
confirmed by King II in section VI, who indicates that disclosure highlights misconduct
and non-perfoffi1ance.
In terms of the new UK Section 401A individual packages should be justified in the records
and the level of performance of each director is to be specified in the financial statement.
With these more stringent rules, it would be much more difficult for directors to walk away
with undeserved shareholder monies.
362 JJ Du Plessis 'Corporate governance: Some reflections on the South African law and the Germanic two
tier board system' 1998 (4) CLDS, 29
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7.3 ENHANCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN SETTING
EXECUTIVE PAY
Bolstering shareholder involvement in the determination of executive pay is another option
for reform. The current legal position is that whenever the articles of association authorize
the board of directors to make decisions on a company's behalf, the general meeting cannot
dictate to the directors how to exercise its powers. 363 As such, shareholders in South Africa
cannot exercise any form of control over executive remuneration except where the
Companies Act grants them some Ineasure of control to pass resolutions.364 While South
African companies must be able to attract and retain the best executives in the world, the
linkage between pay and performance is also rightly a matter of concern to shareholders. It
was shown earlier that when directors receive generously handsome packages, these will in
some Ineasure lead to a dissipation of profits which otherwise would be available to
shareholders.
Moreover, granting executive directors performance related incentives like LTIPS and
share options lead to a dilution of existing equity which would result in shareholders
getting a significantly less voting power and lower earnings per share.365 In as much as
granting them greater direct say might probably not address fully the concerns raised over
executive remuneration; it is believed that their contribution would not impact negatively
on managerial remuneration in South Africa. Section 40 lA of the UK Companies Act
grants shareholders much more say in the determination of executive pay.366 The fact that
shareholders can now vote on director's pay for the first time since company law was
changed in 2002 has forced some business leaders to make clear that they will reduce pay
and bonuses of their senior bosses.367
363 Automatic SelfCleansing Filter Syndicate v Cunninghame (1906) 2 Ch 34
364 See Chapter 3
365 B Cheffins, R Thomas ' Should shareholders have a greater say over executive remuneration', 287
366 A number of disadvantages have been leveled against shareholders passing resolutions on executive
remuneration. For one, in the UK, Section 376 of the companies Act 1985, an individual shareholder or small
group of investors must own at least 5 per cent of the voting rights of a company in order to make an AGM
proposal. Often, only a tiny fraction of investors control sufficient votes to make a shareholder proposal at an
AGM.
367 K Griffiths 'UK bosses earn more but return less' Business Times 21 May 2003
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The point is, shareholder funds are utilized to finance directors' salaries, as such, they
368 . b . . 1 fshould at least have a say in the matter. Indeed, It would e contrary to pnnClp es 0
corporate democracy if they did not; hence why boards of directors are authorized by
members to take up decisions.
Even though shareholder's votes are regarded merely as advisory, and therefore may not
have much direct influence over the setting of executive pay, it can prove effective in that
where boards know that there is shareholder activism within the company, which may see
the packages set struck down on the basis of non performance, such boards would approach
the issues of setting directors pay with much more caution and would more than likely hid
the recommendations made by shareholders. King II reiterates this and says that
'requirements to disclose remuneration in annual reports are seen as a constructive
opportunity to communicate with shareholders on all aspects of remuneration' .369
One may argue that it would be impracticable to call a meeting of men1bers every time a
company wished to make a benefaction. However, with remuneration reports being tabled
at the AGM with the financial statements, it follows that the company would have to make
executive remuneration awards at particular periods for approval by shareholders at a
members meeting. Thus, shareholders should give approval of all remuneration packages
and South Africa should envisage the possibility of mandatory rules on shareholder
involvement in decision-making in this field. It is submitted that South African
shareholders can vote against the company's accounts when presented at the AGM can
exert pressure on directors who award themselves hefty packages to stlike them down.
They can also express concern by declining to approve the re-election of directors who
were members of a company's remuneration committee. However, as practice has shown,
shareholders hardly ever raise any concerns in this regard. It is submitted that stringent
rules relating to shareholder power voting over executive remuneration should be increased
and endorsed. It should be made easier for shareholders to propose resolutions and to vote
~:: J McLennan 'Misappropriation ofcompany funds: a proposal for reform', 658
.) Para 3.5 of Appendix V
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at AGMs on executive pay. They should also be allowed to vote on the board's
remuneration report on an annual basis. It is recommended that if a listed company fails to
secure shareholder approval in accordance with the law and Listing Rules, such company
be censured or be removed from the listing register.
With regard to the length of service contracts of executive directors, King II at 2.5.9
indicates that it does not favour lengthy service contracts and makes a suggestion that none
should exceed three years in duration unless the shareholders approve an extended contract
and full disclosure and reasons are made. In order for us to avoid rolling contracts, which
King II does not really address, it is proposed that the length of service contracts be
shortened further to an annum. In this case, shareholders could endorse, by resolution,
agreements with a term of one year. Greenbury report indicates that the permitted duration
should be one year, with longer contracts being prohibited unless approved at a general
meeting of the shareholders. 37o In this way, companies would be subject to shortened
rolling contracts, which constantly renews itself. In this way, in the event of directors
exiting office, the company will be saved a lot of money, which could be utilized to pay for
handsome golden parachutes. Shareholders should be granted leave to use a special
resolution that requires a three quarters majority of the votes cast to displace the obligation
to vote on each remuneration package. The recommendation made by King II of a
reduction in service contracts is welcomed. However, it is felt that the law still has to be
developed further and it is the author's view that these contracts be endorsed at a general
meeting where shareholders should pass a special resolution to authorize any longer
contracts in this regard. In this way, shareholders will be seen to be actively involved in the
setting of executive remuneration.
7.4 PERFORMANCE RELATED INCENTIVES
With regard to performance related packages, it is recommended that golden handshakes be
clearly stated in the contract of employment and the circumstances under which it shall be
paid out must be discussed. The amount agreed upon and the terms upon which such
370 Para 7.12 and 7.13
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monies would be payable should then be approved by not only the remuneration committee
and the board of directors, but shareholders must also be party to such a decision. It was
seen earlier that in the UK, shareholders of GlaxoSmithKline recently struck down a
severance package of one of the directors and refused to pass a resolution on it. 371 The pre-
contract agreement will enable the board to have proper checks and balances in place
before the executive who is likely to benefit frOlTI golden handshake becomes a member of
the decision making team or board of directors of the company.
It was earlier intimated that there is no alignment of performance and shareholders
interests. A director who is awarded share options does not get to lose his or her net asset
worth should the market plummet, as he or she will not exercise the option held; no one can
compel such directors to sell, even though the plummeting shares are directly linked to
their bad performance. The alignment of risk between shareholders and directors can be
improved and achieved more effectively at lower cost to the company with some simple
reforms of share options and bonuses. As a solution to this problem, one may suggest that
ordinary shares, rather than share options, be awarded to directors as an incentive. The use
of share appreciation schemes rather than options means that the stock base is not
diluted.372 In line with recent corporate governance reforms, non-executive directors can
forgo a pOliion or all of their director's fees to subscribe for ordinary shares in the
company.373 This way, they will strive for the betterment of the company and its increased
market share prices. 374 One may still argue however, that the directors in issue can still
utilize the fees that they receive to purchase the shares. However, it would work better in
the sense that their fees will better be aligned to their performance in the company. In
addition, the timing of the exercise of such options could be made a term in the contract of
service so as to remove speculative gains from timing the sale date to maximum effect. 375
371 Note 342 above
372 Tricker, 337
373 This has recently been suggested by the UK Secretary of Trade in its proposal, passed for comment by the
public on how best to curb exorbitant director's payouts and share options for failed fat cat executives. This is
in response to the public outcry over corporate director's pay. 'Hewitt to propose laws to curb fat-cat
payouts 1 www.Businesstimes.co.za 5 June 2003
374 King II briefly makes reference in passing to this issue, that in some jurisdictions' markets, the view is that
non-executive directors should receive shares rather than options.
375 Tricker, 337
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It is noted that as a result of remuneration committee's composition of a majority of non-
executive directors, it becomes very difficult for non-executive directors to exercise
restraint and to make decisions on incentives for executives without a conflict of interest.,
It is inappropriate for the remuneration committee to make recommendations on the basis
of remuneration of non-executive directors. Even though some scholars
376
feel that it
should be a matter for the board as a whole, and that shareowners should vote on and
approve the recommended packages, it is submitted that this role should rather be left with
independent supervisory boards as adopted in the two-tier board system applied in
Germany. Non-executive directors should not be allowed to participate in the company's
annual bonus plan, share option scheme or long term incentive plan. It is recommended that
to avoid the bias associated with non-executive directors setting pay, eradication of share
options would lead to the curtailment of exorbitant remuneration packages.
7.5 NEW TAX MEASURES
It is proposed that the government should consider new tax measures relating to top pay.
As a way of curbing excessive pay, perhaps South Africa could also look to the United
States of America for guidance. In this jurisdiction, Bill Clinton in his campaign pledge in
1993 spurred changes to the Internal Revenue Code, which meant that a corporation that
paid an executive more than $1 million annually could treat the expenditure as deductible
for tax purposes only if the additional amount was paid pursuant to a performance based
plan.377 However, a plan can only be performance based if the shareholders ratify the
scheme. Hence, if a company wants to avail itself of the deduction when it introduces a
stock option scheme, those owning equity must have a say in it. South Africa can adopt the
same policy and set a minimum threshold amount within which tax concessions can be
attained.
376 T Wixley, G Everingham, 56
377 B Cheffins, S Thomas' Should shareholders have a greater say over executive remuneration', 298
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It is submitted that limits should be set with regard to interlocking directorships. Rules that
will impose the maximum number of boards in which a director can participate either as an
executive or a non executive director have to be devised. It is felt that service on too many
boards can interfere with an individual's ability to perform responsibilities. Most
importantly, it interferes with their duties to avoid conflict if interest in as far as executive
pay is concerned.
7.6 LEGISLATIVE REGULATION
Other means of reducing executive remuneration entail engaging government regulation on
legislation reforms. The government can impose some levels or measures to preclude pay
rises exceeding specified designated levels, such as the rate of inflation.378 Even though the
control of prices may to some extent prove difficult and not beneficial in the long run, to
try and deal with the imbalances of pay packages to top executives and low ranking
employees, government can enact a law to say that remuneration paid to top management
in a company should not be more than a specified number of times larger than the salary of
the average employee.379
It is further submitted that even though legislation lacks flexibility and can have a negative
effect in setting pay packages, the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 should be
revisited and revised to an extend that it should include recent developments. The current
legislation and the common law do not work towards cUliailment of executive
remuneration. It is felt that legislation will create a greater consciousness of the overriding
duty owed to companies particularly among those who administer companies but are not
trained in company law. As McLennan indicates when quoting Professor Naude that 'the
378 BR Cheffins (Note 296 above), 701
379 These plans were attempted in the US in 1973 but failed wherein a law was passed to say that no executive
could receive a pay rise of more than 5 per cent in any given year, even if an individual was moving to a
better job with another company. In this instance, invariably, all did not change any jobs. This scheme was
altered to read that the pay ceiling did not apply when people took a new job with a different company. This
proved unproductive since everyone became willing to change employers. For this reason, the entire plan was
abandoned.
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very visible statutory liability forces circumspection on directors and creates an awareness
. d fi ., b' 380of the aVailable reme y or mmonty Inem ers .
Even though a difficult and complex area of the law, it would be desirable to codify civil
remedies for breach of director's duties. Sections underpinning director's fiduciary duties
to his company by regulating conflicts of interest would assist in tackling abuses which the
common law has failed to prevent or address. As previously discussed, directors setting
their own pay constitutes such obvious conflict of interest. It is believed that this would be
the right approach to adopt, 38 1 It is also essential that there be effective disclosure and
accountability to shareholders in this area in respect of publicly quoted companies. It is
submitted that once a statutory statement of duties is enacted, the common law duties will
be linked to the particular jobs performed by each director, irrespective of the actual talents
of the directors who perform the roles. For these reasons, it is the author's view that
common law fiduciary duties of directors and disclosure requirements in financial
statements be legislated. The long-term effects of this move would see the wage gap
decreasing and pay being aligned to a greater extent to performance.
7.7 CONCLUSION
It was seen that judicial intervention does not seem to be a realistic solution and strategy to
adopt for addressing the concerns raised in relation to executive pay. Because of the
pragmatic approach adopted by the courts, probabilities of successfully challenging
excessive remuneration are very restrictive. If executive pay litigation in South Africa were
used on a frequent basis and directors were aware that it is a realistic possibility, it would
be an incentive on their part to address shareholders interests and they would turn to them
by involving them more in decisions pertaining to their pay. Obviously, by involving
shareholders and employees more, and getting them to ratify their conduct, the directors
would be protected from allegations of breaches of their duties of care and loyalty. As such,
380 J McLennan 'Misappropriation of company funds:' 663
381 In the UK, the company law review steering group issued out a Final Report in June 2001 and advances
recommendations to govelnment on simplifying and modernizing the law applicable therein; in particular it
provides a legal framework for all companies and makes proposals on among other things, the revision of the
Companies Act 1985.
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one can recommend that legislature propose new laws that will inhibit director's salaries
spiraling out of control.
Given the concerns raised regarding the Code of Good Practices and the inefficiencies in
our common law and the Companies Act 61 of 1973, it is evident that these instruments
have to be tightened a bit, particularly in relation to the obligations of shareholders in
governance (both in exercising voting power and in engaging in considered dialogue with
companies on disclosures and the obligations of companies to communicate with
shareholders in the annual general meeting. Directors must act in what is believed to be in
the interests of the company. Even though current legislation and the common law is
lacking in this field of corporate governance reforms, it is felt that to enhance and to make
directors weary of their duties to the company and all stakeholders, the law should take a
complete turn and be remodeled along the lines of the UK legislation. It is acknowledged
that a correlation between pay and performance in the UK has not been achieved yet, it is
felt that the new regulations encompassed in the Companies Act 1985 and the new
proposals issued out by the UK Department of Trade and Industry will work more towards
curtailing exorbitant remuneration packages being awarded.
Amid recent corporate scandals pertaining to shocking self enrichment schemes that
directors engage in, it is felt that in South Africa, these practices will ultimately come to an
end given the stringent regulations enacted and suggested shareholder activism or
involvement in South Africa. The limitless prerogative of directors having the ultimate say
on setting remuneration packages including their own should come to an end. With
shareholders taking the lead in actively scrutinizing directors pay, a true alignment of pay
and performance will ultimately be struck; it is hoped that we will also see the wage gap
decreasing to expected levels in South Africa and the world over.
The roles of other stakeholders should also not be lost sight of. Employees' should actively
be engaged in committees set for the determination of executive remuneration. Their
participation will lead to the wage gap being radically cut in that members at such
committees will remain weary of the interests not only of shareholders, but of employees as
111
well. Surely, while motivations are made for increases in pay packages of executives, the
low ranking officers will not be forgotten. They will see to it that the differences as to
cause concern over such packages are considered.
It remains to be seen whether an alignment would ultimately be struck between pay and
performance or whether other guidelines have to be developed which would require those
making decisions on executive pay matters to be sensitive to the needs of the wider scene
including pay and working conditions elsewhere in the company. The introduction of
shareholder activism should be seen as a positive move towards introducing some measures
in curtailing corporate fat cats pay.
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